I'm working on IoT gateway which will collect data from IoT devices. IoT device is a constrained device which couldn't use HTTPS.
It sends periodically small amount of data - from sensors, with some aditional information as time, message id, unit id etc.
Right now we've got an implementation of gateway as REST API in Java open for everyone. So It accepts requests as JSON from any device, without ensuring that data comes from our device are not corupted or compromised.
Without having ability to secure data by HTTPS, what is the best way to design interface between gateway and device?
Without having ability to secure data by HTTPS, what is the best way to design interface between gateway and device?
You can still use a symmetric encryption/authentication to ensure integrity and confidentiality, which should be feasible even for low end devices
As an inspiration you may have a loot at JWE with a shared key.
You could limit replays using some timestamp/counter or having idempotent consumers.
Regardless that - missing tls/https ypu have to take care of a lot of things, such as how to protect a shared key, update if revoked, etc
If the device can't do https (with any set of cipher suites) you will probably have to make serious compromises and not have some aspects of a secure connection. A bit simplified, but https is pretty much the minimal full suite of how it can be done, there is nothing "unnecessary". You might not need everything, but it entirely depends on your usecase and threat model. Before implementing this, you should have a full understanding of exactly what https provides, and how, so you can use applicable parts. Also note that this is not at all straightforward to implement, a custom implementation will likely be vulnerable.
How constrained is your device really? There are small implementations of TLS that wouldn't require you to compromise on security such as wolfSSL.
Footprint sizes (compiled binary size) for wolfSSL range between 20-100kB depending on build options and the compiler being used.
Regarding runtime memory usage, wolfSSL will generally consume between 1-36 kB per SSL/TLS session.
Anyway, I would not recommend you try and implement your own cipher suite unless you REALLY know what you are doing.
Given the kind of tools you've mentioned having access to (HTTP/JSON), I suggest looking at JOSE, which is a standardized way of signing and encrypting this kind of data. Specifically you'll be interested in JWE, JWS, and JWT. The learning curve for JOSE is unfortunately somewhat steep and the docs are somewhat sparse, but it is quite effective and implemented on a variety of platforms, and will save you a lot of headache in inventing your own protocols (which is quite difficult to do correctly). I've had pretty good luck building custom systems around JOSE.
There are some key questions you need to ask:
Do you need mutual authentication, or only authentication of the device? If the device only writes and never reads, then you likely only need to authenticate the device and not the server.
Can you accept the risk of a single shared secret baked into the devices? The problem with a single shared secret is that if any device is reverse engineered, then all protection is lost until you phase out all devices with that key.
Can you accept the manufacturing cost of a per-device secret? Depending on your manufacturing process, generating a unique secret for each device may be difficult.
Can you accept the on-device storage space and processing requirements of a client certificate? If not, can you accept the logistics of maintaining a server-side database of every device's key? (If you can except neither, then you'll have to go with a single shared secret for the whole system.)
My gut feeling is you're talking about a device that can handle the complexity of a client cert, but not a full HTTPS stack. If you also can handle the complexity of generating a certificate during manufacturing, or your customers are willing to register their devices, then I recommend the following:
During manufacture or registration, generate a certificate and signing request. Send it to your server to be signed, and install the signed X.509 on the device. (Generating a CSR on the device is also an option, but many small devices lack the entropy to generate a decent random number. There are tradeoffs either way.)
Generate a certificate for the server, and install its public key on all devices.
Assuming the amount of data you're sending is small, I'd bundle it all into the JWT (web token), encrypted to the server's public key, and signed with the client's private key. Typically JWTs are used to exchange authentication information, but they're really just a standardized container for sending signed and encrypted JSON data, so they really can be anything you want.
In order to prevent replay attacks, the server needs to keep track of messages its seen before. There are two main approaches I like, depending on your situation:
Make the jti (JWT ID) a combination of the timestamp and a random value (in which case the server just needs to keep a cache of recent JTIs and reject too-old timestamps)
Make the jti a combination of the device id and a monotonically increasing message id. The server then needs to keep track of the last-seen message id for each device, and reject any ids less-than-or-equal to that.
If you don't need encryption, look at JWS instead, which just signs the data. None of these techniques require encryption, and it's a little simpler if you take that part out (you don't need a server certificate, for example). You can still prevent replays, and only allow trusted clients to connect. It is possible for someone to reverse engineer your device and pull out its client cert. The advantage of a client cert is that if you discover the abuse, you can then just ban that one cert. With a shared secret you can't do that.
The basic advantage of all of this is that JOSE is based on JSON, which is something you already understand and know how to parse and work with. But it's also reasonably compact for a string-based protocol. It's also extremely flexible in terms of algorithms, which makes it much easier to implement on smaller hardware. You could build all the same things by hand using public/private keys, but JOSE has already thought through many of the tricky security problems.
If only it were better documented....
Related
After the player is authenticated, he receives a random, unique identification token. Every packet sent by him includes the token. A typical message would be:
token sequence_number commands
The problem is that, if somebody saw a packet, the person would be able to act as the player and give all the player's coins to somebody else for example. Or read the player's messages, or do anything short of stealing personal info.
So I thought encryption would be a requirement. But I've found many people advocating against it, one even says "it's complete paranoia" (https://gamedev.stackexchange.com/a/25551/33993).
Is there a way to avoid MITM attacks without encryption? If not, is avoiding them unnecessary?
The linked question says, "Only if it is an in-game purchase/micro-transaction - and then why not just use something tried and true like HTTPS."
Https is regarded as sufficient for MITM protection.
By which I mean: Yes!, you should send your traffic on Https!
It will have an impact on performance, but (obviously) lots and lots of effort has gone into optimizing that. A lot of the cost happens on establishing an Https connection. For an ongoing game connection, you should be able to keep it open, and the performance impact will be lessened.
As commenters have mentioned, Https uses TLS for encryption. You can build your own TCP or even UDP protocol using TLS, as well, but these days I'd recommend if possible, use boring old TCP/Https. All the platforms have APIs for it, there's ways to make it realtimey, and it plays probably the easiest with home routers & firewalls, and will be unsurprising when you explain it to others.
See pusher and socket.io and long polling for examples of using http/https for realtime.
MITM protection without encrypting the communication channel is difficult. You could use a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to protect key components from being changed. But you still need a shared secret that has to be exchanged over a different channel or using encryption (HTTPS).
You might want to take a look at the Hawk authentication scheme on how to exchange data securely over an unencrypted channel.
Typical encryption (example: HTTPS) is not sufficient to defeat MITM (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack) attacks. The wiki page has a simple example of how MITM is able to defeat encryption. There are complex methods to defeat MITM but they are typically overkill for a web game.
To answer your question, encryption does not defend against MITM, but it is necessary to implement encryption as it has more to do with securing sensitive information (example, passwords, session keys etc) as it passes through the internet. Otherwise anyone listening on the network will be able to see those information in plain text.
I'm a young professional who's into embedded design, IT networking, control/monitoring systems and much more. Currently, I'm developing a monitoring system using a device from Tibbo Techonology, their DS1102.
http://tibbo.com/products/controllers/ds110x/ds1102
It's a programmable device that covers serial and ethernet communications. For my project, its main tasks are serial data collection and database population. Serial communication is done through RS485 and database used is MySQL 5.5. My database is hosted on a public IP which also runs a webserver for the interface while my device is behind a NAT. It connects to the database directly using the public IP.
I'd like to ask for advices so that I can enhance and upgrade it. Right now these are the
questions I'd like to ask.
Which is better? Having the server on a public IP or using port forwarding?
I'm also using it as webserver for the interface of my monitoring system.
To communicate with the device (rebooting, changing IP etc), I wrote an application in
python using UDP (using port 65535 of device) and also set the device to communicate with the application for specific commands. My concern is I want to encrypt the communication between my python app and the device both ways. The only available function for both encrypting and decrypting on the DS1102 is RC4. What are your thoughts on using RC4 for this application? Also, I'm planning to do port forwarding on port 65535 so that I can use my python app from the outside. Can RC4 be reliable for this too? I really want to learn how to use encryptions properly.
I'm also planning to implement SMTP for alert messages. Tibbo has a sample code from which I based mine. Problem is, it's on AUTH PLAIN LOGIN. I think I want to turn it to STARTTLS later. Can you recommend some lessons on the algorithm of STARTTLS?
What are those details on MAIL FROM:<> and RCPT TO:<>? Because on using the command
DATA, the programmer can write anyway From: and To: which can make his identity someone else.
That's it for now. Suggestions are very welcome.
You can also share some good reading materials and links. I'm always hungry for learning. :)
Thanks for your time.
2.
Encryption substitutes the confidentiality of an arbitrary amount of data (the plaintext) with the confidentiality of a small amount data (the key). In other words, your communication is only as confidential as the key – if the shared secret key leaks out, the encryption is worthless. More on this.
Also note that plain RC4 provides no authenticity (message integrity). An adversary can modify messages as much as he wants. He can even send his own messages which will be considered perfectly valid by the cipher. Verifying the validity of the messages is is up to the code that parses the messages.
If your messages are simple (only a few bytes or so), an adversary could simply send random bytes until they decrypt such that they form a valid message, without knowing anything about the key. This happens on average after only 100 attempts for a 1-byte message for example.
You will obviously have to use some sort of a nonce to prevent trivial replay attacks.
RC4 is also rather quirky per se. I guess you are already aware of the numerous "drop-n" variants and so on.
In short, protocol design is perilous. Even experts often get it wrong (look at WEP for example). The most straightforward way to solve this would be to find hardware that can handle an existing protocol such as TLS.
I have created a back-end/processing/statistics for POS transactions for a retail store chain. The thing is, now it is time to move from alpha to beta, and we need some sort of safety for the incoming data. And this is where I am lost. How do I implement some resemblance of security in this kind of system?
What I have come up with is a simple asymetric key/value pair, that is unique for each POS system, where the server has all of the private keys, and each pos has the public part of this exchange. In addition to this, all of the data exchange is sent via HTTPS.
Does this kind of thing make sense? Or is there a better way to keep the data safe?
P.S. Since there is a need to reconfigure each POS seperately, that is in no way connected to this system, having to do manual work at each POS is not a problem.
You'd like to accomplish 2 things:
1) Encrypt the traffic so that it is hidden from outsiders (confidentiality). You can accomplish this quite easily simply by enforcing that SSL is used for traffic between the client(s) and the server. The server will require an x509 certificate to accomplish this.
2) Ensure that all traffic coming to the server originates from a trusted client/POS (integrity). You can accomplish this using a couple of different techniques, both of which require an x509 certificate installed on each client (POS) system:
a) Require that all requests to the server be accompanied by client certificates. In this scenario, the client (POS) has a x509 certificate installed, for which it is able to access its own private key (the server does not, and should not have this private key, it belongs to the client). The server is configured to require client certificates with each request, it also is configured to validate that the client certificate presented does indeed match one of the POS systems. So if you add a new POS later, you need to make a change to the server ensuring that it will consider the new POS cert valid. Here is a description of the protocol for your own enrichment, you shouldn't need to know exactly how it works (because most tools IIS, Apache, etc. will abstract much of this for you) but it does demystify things a bit. http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/tivihelp/v5r1/index.jsp?topic=%2Fcom.ibm.itim.infocenter.doc%2Fcpt%2Fcpt_ic_security_ssl_authent2way.html
OR
b) Require that all requests to the server are digitally signed by trusted clients. Public key (asymmetric) encryption allows you to sign a message. Basically it is signed with the client's (POS) private key, and then anyone (including the server) can verify its integrity by validating the signature using the client's public key. Many tools will actually encrypt and sign the message, which is OK, but if you're already using SSL and performance is a concern, you don't need to encrypt twice. If security is more important than performance, encrypting twice can't hurt. Here is some more info on digital signatures: http://www.cgi.com/files/white-papers/cgi_whpr_35_pki_e.pdf
So you should have a pretty good plan of how to proceed. Feel free to ask around here when you set out to implement these solutions, as there are a lot of things that usually don't work the first time around and debugging it is often difficult. I do recommend a tool called Fiddler or WireShark, which can help debug web services to some extent. Be sure that your client(s) can access their own private keys, and that the certificates of the clients are trusted by the server. Good luck.
http://fiddler2.com/
Instead of spending a bunch of $$ on ssl, can I implement RSA on my own? (I don't care about proving the site's identity; I just want to encrypt a password between clients and the server to protect from man-in-the-middle attacks). I've read that any custom solutions are likely to be very insecure, but could someone read my plan and give a thoughtful response?
First I would create public and private keys. I would encrypt the client password with javascript by translating the letters of the password to ascii-values, and then multiply or add (any suggestions?) these ascii-values to get the "unencrypted message". I would then encrypt this message using javascript and the public key.
On the server, I would decrypt the secure message using the private key and end up with the sum/product of the password's ascii-values. Any tips on how to get the individual letters from that?
Edit: I've reached the conclusion that SSL is the best way to go. I was only looking at the client to server side of the deal (where all the client sends is a password). Of course, the information sent by the server to the client is valuable, and should not be vulnerable to MITM attacks. Thanks for the free SSL suggestions.
Thanks
There are a bunch of reasons not to roll your own encryption.
SSL gives the user confidence that the site is secure and that eavesdroppers cannot view the password on the wire. If you don't use SSL then the usual browser indications that the site is secure will not be present.
It's really hard to get RSA right (or any crypto algorithm for that matter). First off, using raw RSA is insecure and you need to have an appropriate padding mechanism and wotnot to make it actually secure. RSA can also only encrypt n-1 bytes of data, where n is the size of the key.
Leave crypto to the cryptographers. The first issue with your proposed system is that you're missing the point of using a secure transport: You don't need to do any special encoding of your data (the conversion to ascii and multiplying/summing or whatever part) because the secure transport means that eavesdroppers cannot see what's going past.
Your proposal does not protect against man-in-the-middle attacks. It (kinda) prevents eavesdropping, which is a different problem.
That said, you certainly can implement RSA in Javascript with a bit of effort, but just be aware that it is unlikely to be secure until you've had a bunch of cryptanalysts look at it and try to break it. You will make a mistake somewhere along the line, even if you are the best programmer in the world.
The user experience will also suffer because it will be very hard for the user to verify that they are, in fact, talking to your server.
SSL is a well known, well analysed, not-yet-broken protocol that can be free if you use a self-signed certificate (another poor user experience, but at least it's still fairly secure). Think very carefully before you decide to cheap out on the crypto, and make sure you weigh the cost of a certificate against your development time (it'll take you many hours to implement RSA) and the potential cost of leaking important customer information (their password). The cost of the certificate is likely to be insignificant compared to the rest of the project cost.
You can use a self-signed certificate on the server and trust it explicitly on the client (i.e. encode certificate parameters etc). So you don't need to reinvent the wheel. I would say more - depending on the library you can use PSK (pre-shared key) cipher suites and get rid of certificates completely.
I'm not sure you need SSL if you cannot afford a certificate. Obviously, your data you intend to protect does not have much value.
The public/private key system is best way to go. By the time you figure out how to roll your own and get your CA certificate included in all the major browsers and Operating Systems and become your own Certificate authority, I think you will find spending a few 100$ on cert is cheap.
If you are looking for SSL but not spending money use www.startssl.com as that will allow you to use SSL free. Creating your own solution will take time and if not done the correct way will be insecure.
Yes, it is possible to implement plain RSA "by hand" in this way. To create the unencrypted message, you can simply use the bits of the message. For example, if your password is cheese:
c h e e s e
0x63 0x68 0x65 0x65 0x73 0x65
The number to encrypt could then be simply 0x636865657365. You'll need to use math routines that can handle large integers (native Javascript numbers aren't big enough).
Standard warnings apply, your solution will have a fatal flaw in some way, etc etc.
I don't care about proving the site's identity; I just want to encrypt a password between clients and the server to protect from man-in-the-middle attacks)
That's exactly why you do care about proving the site's identity.
That in turn is why just using RSA without an authentication scheme isn't secure. It's no good having a secret conversation when you can't identify who you're talking to.
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First of all,
do those successful commercial MMORPGs use encryption for game data transmission?
I got an impression that many developers tend to not use encryption, because it can not prevent reverse engineering for cheating and making private server, but doesn't it effectively reduce the number of those?
Encryption also impacts performance, even just a little.
Good encryption does prevent network sniffering and man-in-the-middle, are these important for MMORPGs?
How about protecting chat messages for privacy concerns?
How do you think?
PS: I'm talking about game data, not user/password, auth info need to be encrypted for sure.
Encryption is a tool. Make sure the tool fits the problem.
Encryption is useful for essentially three things: 1) 3rd party can't view data, 2) both parties are who they say they are, 3) data hasn't be modified. None of those really apply here. Remember the client is on the user (attacker) machine. If they modify the client it will gladly sign & encrypt any message they want.
The second thing to consider is the fact that the client has the keys and thus you should assume the attacker also has the keys. Even if you use asymmetric encryption the client has the key to decrypt anything it receives. If you send "private data" to the client an attack can find the key and decrypt it.
A good MMORPG (deisgned to make cheating difficult) should assume two things:
a) user/attacker can see any data sent to client (so don't send things to client you don't want user to see)
b) an attacker can send any possible command to the user (so don't rely on the client for security).
In most MMORPG the client is little more than a dumb terminal with impressive graphics. All computation, error checking, and validation occurs server side. The client doesn't determine is you hit or miss, nor does it determine how much damage. The client simply tells the server "I am attack with item 382903128." or some other action (not result). The server validates that the player has access to that option, has the item, and the command is valid at this time. To prevent sniffing attacks the client is only given data that the user would have access to anyways.
In any security context, you need to think about what exactly the threat scenarios are.
Attacker A has access to a machine running the game client and wants to write a bot to automate his actions so as to win battles easily.
Attacker B is eavesdropping on packets on a local network, with the aim of
Stealing login credentials so as to play the game for free.
Spying on player-to-player private chat, perhaps to gain advantage in the game, or maybe for blackmail or harassment in the real world.
Inserting extra behaviour into the stream of commands, e.g. instructions to buy or sell items at prices that make money for the attacker.
Encryption has no effect on attacker A (since the game client can decrypt the communication, so can the attacker; counter-measures must be taken on the server) but defeats attacker B.
I disagree with some of the other answers about the value of the data being transmitted. Your private chats with other players are as worthy of protection as your instant messages with them, and your gold and possessions, earned with hours of toil, deserve some protection from attackers, if perhaps not as much as your dollars in a bank account.
During the 90's Ever Quest used a low level packet encryption. I recall fondly as there used to be a side application that would sniff the packet data and give you a zone wide info about everyone in the zone. The EQ team crippled this for a while when they added the packet encryption, but that didn't stop the hacker community as they would just get the key out off the client machine. So in the end, it really didn't help in any way.
As to the other MMO's out there, I've not looked at the packet data to make a determination one way or the other.
You don't need encryption for security per se.
Consider this 'packet':
<USER_ID><COMMAND><MD5HASH>
The MD5HASH is generated from the USER_ID + COMMAND + some other value both the server and client know, but is not transmitted over the wire (user email or some token supplied securely during login). The server can reconstruct the string used for hashing and verify the authenticity of the command. If some man-in-the-middle changes the COMMAND, the hash won't match.
Besides validating authenticity this method also allows you to check you received the entire instruction. (It's possible that your 'game packet' is spread across multiple TCP/IP packets, some might get lost, etc.)
This does not prevent snooping around in messages, but is does prevent tampering. It's a game, who cares about what players say? I mean, emails are unencrypted and nobody cares about those, while their contents is more valuable than the average in-game chat.
Encryption is always a good thing if it actually protects valuable data. For that would be bank data, mails, instant messaging and file transfers. Not because I'm terribly paranoid of my ISP or network provider, but there is a specific risk if you are in an open network (for instance, school networks or company networks), that someone might be reading sniffing network traffic.
For MMORPGS I don't see a benefit in either security nor in performance, since most data is highly session based and man-in-the-middle attacks are rather unlikely (because, afterall, why would you want to sniff and attack such a connection?).
What I would do is to transmit passwords and login credentials as hashed values (or even encrypt just that part), and leave the rest of the connection cleartext; so you don't suffer from CPU hogging and lag caused by encryption (especially when there is a heavy load on the server).
At least the login should be encrypted, and the client should verify the public key of the server against a white-list to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
Encrypting the data transfered during the game itself isn't that important.
You need to distinguish encryption and obfuscation which have quite different goals.For example SSL is useful as encryption but useless as obfuscation since the encryption happens in known APIs, and it's trivial to intercept the plaintext when it gets passing into/out from these APIs.
Obfuscation needs to be mixed into your own code and doesn't need to be cryptographically secure.
Encryption needed vs administrators of local network or Wi-Fi, they potentially could sniff your traffic/packets and grab/change game information/passwords.
Tipically (99.99999%) accounts are hacked by trojans, not by packet sniffing. So in 99.99999% encryption is useless.
Encryption is totally useless vs Botting or Cheating. For that cases there is special forces, like - Anti-Cheating/Bot systems.