I'm currently working on an asp.net application which makes use of a user system
and I was curious about how data was actually sent towards the server from the client.
It appears that the information which is being sent can be easily traced because it isn't encrypted into a hashcode or anything. It's plain ordinary text.
I've used an application called "SocketSniff" for reading the data.
The data sent back appears to be stored in the scriptmanager using the element ID and its value.
Do you know any way to avoid the scriptmanager from showing element contents?
I'm guessing it has something to do with the ViewState but this didn't work at all.
I'm not a security specialist but encrypting sent data and the viewstate are two different things.
When you send data over the internet not only the data from your webform is send but, the entire webform is send back to the server. (not using javascript / AJAX) this is only encrypted if you use a certificate. You can easily buy one and it does not have to be expensive. Please note that when you debug the page in Google Chrome (data will appear not to be encrypted) it gets encrypted in the background when you send it.
The viewstate is used for storing data and preventing page forgery. It’s not 100% bulletproof. But if the page is not very interesting for a hacker (the effort often isn’t worth it) I don’t think your building the webapplication for the FBI, CIA or an International Bank so don’t worry about that. When you alter a page “HTML” and add values to elements that can not have a (specific value). Id’s for example. IIS finds a forgery. IIS send a page with Id 123 and get a forged page back with Id 456 in a specific element. Withoud a vieustate this could lead to a CRUD (Create, Retrieve, Update or Delete) operation. Now IIS sees the forgery and gives an error to the user.
Hope it helps.
Related
I am quite new to WebForms and I'm trying to understand the ViewState. AFAIK today, it keeps modifications of the UI over postbacks to the same page. But why does it send the state (= stored modifications) to the client and does not keep it on the server saving CPU cycles and bandwidth?
Am I understanding something completely wrong?
The view state is something intrinsically connected to the view, as the name implies, and trying to manage it separately while maintaining that relation is not something that is easily accomplished.
You would need to store view state per page, so you would still have to send to the client an ID in order to be able to get the correct view state on a postback. Another serious issue is that you send a page to the client but you don't know when or if the client is going to postback that page to the server, so you would need to store view state at least until the session expires.
This could lead to a waste of server resources, as all those view states are being stored for users that may never postback to the server. If you keep your view state slim you'll agree that the best place to store it is to send it with view.
Finally, if you're still not happy with the view state on the client you can override the SavePageStateToPersistenceMedium and LoadPageStateFromPersistenceMedium methods of the page and save it to another medium. I've already heard many people complain about view state on the client, and most time I just tell them to go ahead and implement persistence to another medium on the server... however, I believe no one ever did, probably because it's complicated and you'll end up with a solution that's not that clean.
ViewState is used when a page performs a post back in order to restore the control tree of the page to what is was when the page was last rendered.
This allows for instance a GridView control to keep it's state (what is shown in the GridView) on post back without having to rebind it to the same data.
The reason why the ViewState per default is serialized and sent to the client is (I guess) that it's the easiest way to get it back when the client performs a post back.
What if for instance a user has several browser windows open with the same page loaded and you have the viewstate stored in the Session? Assigning the correct viewstate to the different windows in such a case can of course be solved, but having the client explicitly post it seems to be the easiest way.
That said, it is possible to have the viewstate stored in the Session. See for instance this link.
Other possibilities are available by implementing your own System.Web.UI.PageStatePersister.
Thanks to everyone who commented or posted an answer! I've kept my original question and update below for completeness.
[Feb 16, 2011 - Update 2] As some people point out - my question should have been: Given a standard asp.net 4 form, if I don't have any server side validation, what types of malicious attacks am I susceptible to?
Here is my take away on this issue.
If data isn't sensitive (comments on a page) - from an asp.net security standpoint, following standard best practices (SqlParameters, request validation enabled, etc) will protect you from malicious attacks.
For sensitive data/applications - it's up to you to decide what type of server side validation is appropriate for your application. You need to think the end to end solution (webservices, other systems, etc). You can view a number of suggestions below - whitelist validation, etc.
If you are using ajax (xhr requests) to post user input you need to reproduce the protection from the other bullets in your code on the server. Again, lots of solutions below – like ensuring that the data does not contain any html/code, etc. (side note: the .net framework requestValidationMode="4.0" does afford some protection in this regard - but I can't speak to how complete a solution it is)
Please feel free to continue to comment...if any of the above is incorrect please let me know. Thanks!
[Feb 3, 2011 - Update 1] I want to thank everyone for their answers! Perhaps I should ask the reverse question:
Assume a simple asp.net 4.0 web form (formview + datasource with request validation enabled) that allows logged in users to post comments to a public page (comments stored in sql server db table). What type of data validation or cleansing should I perform on the new "comments" on the server side?
[Jan 19, 2011 - Original Question] Our asp.net 4 website has a few forms where users can submit data and we use jquery validate on the client side. Users have to be logged in with a valid account to access these forms.
I understand that our client side validation rules could easily be bypassed and clients could post data without required fields, etc. This doesn’t concern me very much - users have to be logged in and I don’t consider our data very “sensitive” nor would I say any of our validation is “critical”. The input data is written to the database using SqlParameters (to defend against sql injection) and we depend on asp.net request validation to defend against potentially dangerous html input.
Is it really worth our time to rewrite the various jquery validation rules on the server? Specifically how could a malicious user compromise our server or what specific attacks could we be open to?
I apologize as it appears that this question has been discussed a few times on this site – but I have yet to find an answer that cites specific risks or issues with not performing server side validation. Thanks in advance
Hypothetical situation:
Let's say you have a zip code field. On the client-side you validate that it must be in a "00000" or "00000-0000" pattern. Since you're allowing a hyphen, you decide to store the field as a varchar in the database.
So, some evil user comes along and decides to bypass all of your client-side validation and submit something that's not in the correct format and makes it past the request validation.
Ok, no big deal..., you're encoding it before displaying it back to the user later anyway.
But what else are you doing with that zip code? Are you submitting it to web service for some sort of lookup? Are you uploading it to a GPS device? Will it ever be interpreted by something else in the future? Does your zipcode field now contain some JSON or something else weird?
Or something like this: http://www.businessinsider.com/livingsocial-server-flaw-2011-1
Security is a dependability attribute that is defined as the probability that the system resists to an attack, or else the probability a fault is not maliciously activated.
In order to implement security, you must perform a threat analysis. Complex computer systems are subject to deeper analyses (think about an aircraft's o a control tower's equipment) as they become more critical and threats pose business or human life at risk.
You can perform your own threat analysis by questioning yourself what happens if a user bypasses validation?.
Two groups of answers, by examples:
Group 1 (critical)
The user can buy articles paying less than their price
The user can be revealed information about other users
The user obtains privileges he/she is not supposed to have
Group 2 (non critical)
The user is displayed inconsistent data in the next page
Processing continues, but the inconsistency leads to an error that requires human intervention
The user's data (but only of that user, not others) get compromised
A strange error page is returned to the user, with lots of technical information that cannot be used anyway
In the first case, you must definitely fix your validation problem, because you could lose money after an attack, or lose the trust of your public (think about forging Facebook URLs and showing someone's photos even if you are not mutually friends).
In the second case, if you are sure that an inconsistent field doesn't put your business or the data at risk, you may still avoid fixing
The real problem is
How do you prove that any inconsistent data sent to your website is never supposed to have any consequence over the system that may pose a threat?
So that's why you lose less time fixing your validation rather than thinking about it
Honestly, users don't care what you consider "sensitive" or "critical" data. Those criteria are up to them to decide.
I know that if I was a user of your application and I saw my data change without me directly doing something to cause the change...I would close my account up as fast as possible. It would be readily apparent that your system wasn't secure and none of my data was safe.
Keep in mind that you're forcing people to log in so you at least have their passwords somewhere. Whether or not they are easily accessed, a breach is a breach and I have lost my trust.
So...while you may not consider an input injection attack important, your users will and that is why you should still do server side input validation.
Your data may not be worth much, that's fine by me.
BUT, attackers could inject CSRF "cross site request forgery" attack code into your application; users of your site may have their data at other sites compromised. Yes, it would require those 'other sites' to have bugs, but that happens. Yes, it would require that users not use the 'logout' buttons on those sites, but not enough people use them. Think of all the tasty data your users have stored at other web sites. You wouldn't something bad to happen to your users.
Attackers could inject HTML that invites users to download and install 'plugins necessary for viewing this content' -- plugins that are keyloggers, or search hard drives for credit card numbers or tax filings. Maybe a plugin to become spambots or porn hosts. Your users trust your site to not recommend plugins that are owned by the Yakuza, right? They might not feel friendly if your site recommends installing evil things.
Depending upon what kinds of bugs invalid data might trigger, you might find yourself a spambot or a porn host. It heavily depends on how defensively you have coded other aspects of your application. Too many applications blindly trust input data.
And the best part: your users aren't human. Your users are browsers, which might be executing attacks supplied by other sites that didn't bother to perform good input validation and output sanitizing. Your users are viruses or worms that happen to find you by chance or by design. You might trust the individuals, but how far do you trust their computers? Me, not very far.
Please write applications to be as secure as you can -- you may put a large button on the front page to drop all users' data if you want -- but please don't intentionally write insecure programs.
This an excellent and brave question. The short (and possibly brave) answer is you don't. If you are aware of all the security vulnerabilities and you still don't believe it's necessary, then that's your choice.
It really depends on who your users are, who the site is exposed to (in terms of intranet or internet) and how easy it is to obtain an account. You say that your data is not sensitive yet you still require users to log in. How bad would it be if an unauthorised user were to access the system by hopping on another user's machine whilst they were elsewhere?
Bear in mind that relying on the request validation to look for malicious input can never be proved to be 100% safe so security is usually done at multiple levels with a fair bit of redundancy.
However it has to be your choice and you are doing the right thing to find out the consequences of leaving this out.
I believe that you need to validate both on the client side and on the server side, and here's why.
On the client side, you are often saving the user from submitting data that is obviously wrong. They have not filled in a required field. They have put letters in a field that is only supposed to contain numbers. They have provided a date in the future when only a date in the past will do (such as date of birth). And so on. By preventing these kinds of mistakes on the client side, you are avoiding user frustration, and also reducing the number of unnecessary hits to your web server.
On the server side, you should generally repeat all of the validation that you did on the client side. That is because, as you have observed, clever users can get around client-side validation and submit invalid data. In addition, there is some validation that is inefficient or impossible to do on the client side. Sometimes, you check that the data entry adheres to business rules. You might check it against existing data in the database. If you just let users enter anything (especially omitting required fields), the website won't function properly for them.
Check out the Tamper Data extension for firefox. You can feed the server anything you want very easily
Anyone performing HTTP POSTs to your server via your web site (with jQuery validation) can also perform HTTP POSTs via some other means that bypasses the jQuery validation. For example, I could use System.Net.HttpWebRequest to POST some data to your server with the appropriate cookies that injects malicious content into the form fields. I'd have to set up the __EVENT_VALIDATION and __VIEWSTATE fields correctly, but if I succeed, I'd be bypassing the validation.
If you don't have server-side data validation, then you are effectively not validating the inputs at all. The jQuery validation is nice for user experience but not a real line of defense.
This is especially so with inputs like a free-form comments field. You definitely want to ensure that the field does not contain HTML or other malicious script. As an extra measure of defense, you should also escape the comment content when it is displayed in your web app with a library like AntiXss (see http://wpl.codeplex.com/).
In terms of client-side vs. server-side validation, my opinion is that client-side validation is just to make sure the form is filled correctly and a user could tamper with the form and bypass the verifications you do in javascript.
On the server-side you could actually make sure that you actually want to store this data and validate it in depth manner and check relative database tables to ensure that your database is always normalized with any data set that you get from the client. I would say even that the server side is more important than the client side in terms of not showing the user what do you look for in the form and how you validate the data.
to summarize, I recommend verification on both sides, but if I had to choose between the two i would recommend server-side validation , but that could mean that your server could potentially performing additional validations that you could have prevented from validating on the client side
To answer your second question:
You need to use a whitelist to keep malicious input out of the incoming comments.
The .NET Framework request validation does a very good job of stopping XSS payloads in incoming POST requests. It may not, however, prevent other malicious or mischevious HTML from getting into the comments (image tags, hyperlinks, etc.).
So if possible I would set up whitelist validation on the server side for allowed characters. A regex should cover this just fine. You should allow A-Za-z0-9, whitespace, and a few punctuation marks. If the regex fails to match, return an error message to the user and stop the transaction. Regarding SQL Injection: I would allow apostrophes through in this case (unless you like terrible grammar in your comments), but put code comments around your parameterized SQL queries to the effect of: "This is the only protection against SQL, so be careful when modifying." You should also lock down the permissions of the database account used by the web process (read/write only, not database owner permissions). What I wouldn't do is try to do blacklist validation on the input, as that is very time consuming to do correctly (see RSnake's XSS Cheat Sheet at http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html for an idea of the number of things you would need to prevent just for XSS).
Between the .NET framework and your own whitelist validation you should be safe from HTML-based attacks such as XSS and CSRF*. SQL injection will be prevented by using parameterized queries. If the comment data touches any other assets you may need to put more controls in place, but those cover the attacks relevant to the basic data submission form you've outlined.
Also, I wouldn't try to "cleanse" the data at all. It is very difficult to do properly and users (as was mentioned above) hate it when their data is modified without their permission. It is more secure and more usable to give user's a clear error message when your data validation fails. If you put their comment back on the page for them to edit, HTML encode the output so you aren't vulnerable to a Reflected XSS attack.
And as always, OWASP.org (http://www.owasp.org) is a good reference for all things webappsec related. Check out their Top Ten and Development Guide projects.
*CSRF may not be a direct concern of yours, as fraudulent posts to your site may not matter to you, but preventing XSS has the side benefit of keeping CSRF payloads targeting other sites from being hosted from your site.
I read this somewhere:
"Because the view state for a given page
must be kept ON THE SERVER, it is possible for the current
state to be out of synchronization with the current page of
the browser, if the user uses the Back feature on the
browser to go back in the history"
I suspect that this may not be the default setting but instead an option to store the viewstate on the server, as what would the point of storing the ViewState in the page AND the server be? Am I correct?
If ViewState is stored on the server, how does one avoid the BackButton isue described here?
ASP.NET ViewState is stored in the client in one (or more) hidden HTML input field. I'd be really interested in seeing where you read that incorrect statement.
The server totally forgets ViewState once sent. As a security measure against tampering, ASP.NET can encrypt it and validate it against its key. If you use a set key (rather than auto-generating one), that view state will be valid even if the server has been shut down and rebooted entirely. All which illustrates that nothing in view state is stored on the server.
I have a page with private properties that are storing a credit card object and a shopping cart object in viewstate so I can maintain a reference to them across postbacks. By the way, the page involved will be using SSL.
Is this safe?
I wouldn't store sensitive information in viewstate ... ever. By doing so, you are delegating security to the implementation of the browser for protecting your customers' data. Vulnerabilities like cross-site scripting (XSS), URL-redirection attacks, and so on could expose this sensitive data to intrusion, theft, or spoofing.
If you are storing such details across postbacks, you should re-evaluate your design - and find a way to avoid doing so.
Viewstate is hackable. If you need to store that info across postbacks, look into storing it in an encrypted database.
EDIT (for the down voter):
Q10. Is ViewState secure by default? Can it be secured? How?
By default, the value of the __VIEWSTATE hidden form field is Base64 encoded and not encrypted. Hence, by default data in ViewState is not secure.
Yes, data in the ViewState can be secured. There are two things that may be done. The first is to use SSL. The second is to ensure that EnableViewStateMac is set to true. This will ensure that the ViewState will be encrypted and also checked against tampering. The default encryption algorithm is SHA1 but it can be changed to MD5 or 3DES, if desired.
That said, one should bear in mind that there is almost always a trade-off between increased security and performance. It is best to avoid storing sensitive data in the ViewState and incurring the performance penalities due to the need to increase security.
page link
Remember that anything contained in the ViewState is being delivered to the client browser (simply stored in a hidden input), and is being passed back and forth from client to server. Encrypting and Decrypting data can be a huge system overhead.
I would say definitely not, If you are needing to store Credit card details across multiple Http requests i would possibly have a rethink about your architecture.
Hope this helps.
I Wouldn't recommend it and really think over my design if i ran in to it. But if you want to do it: store the viewstate on the server.
Read this:
http://aspguy.wordpress.com/2008/07/09/reducing-the-page-size-by-storing-viewstate-on-server/
All the other answers seem to imply that viewstate is completely insecure. I don't agree with that.
ASP.NET can encrypt the viewstate with the server's key. If you do that then in theory it should be safe enough. Having said that, I still don't recommend it. Someone else will come along one day and disable the encryption "for testing purposes" or set a weak key or the server's config file will be compromised somehow and suddenly your credit card numbers are vulnerable.
So yes, there is a measure of security in viewstate, but there are still better ways of doing this. Even storing sensitive data in the user's Session would be much better and quite simple to do.
Few points
MSDN: (Session vs ViewState) While the ViewState data is encoded and may optionally be encrypted, your data is most secure if it is never sent to the client. So, Session state is a more secure option. (Storing the data in the database is even more secure due to the additional database credentials. You can add SSL for even better link security.) But if you've displayed the private data in the UI, presumably you're already comfortable with the security of the link itself. In this case, it is no less secure to put the same value into ViewState as well.
ViewState is Visible in Source :
Although freely accessible in a hidden field called __VIEWSTATE, the view state information is not clear text. By default, a machine-specific authentication code is calculated on the data and appended to the view state string. The resulting text is then Base64 encoded only, but not encrypted. If data confidentiality is desired, however, then SSL is the only solution since it protects not only view state, but all the data that travels to and from the page. Decoding view state is still possible, but a number of steps must be accomplished; not only must several undocumented and internal structures be disassembled, but a number of circumstances must also occur. In addition, consider that a tampered view state is normally detected on the server and a security exception is thrown. Finally, and most important of all, the view state contains data, not code. Unless you explicitly lessen the default security settings for the page, there's not much a hacker can do to modify the view state.
If you change the default security settings, though, you should be careful about the view state. A hacker could modify the data that represents the state of the page. This is not a bug per se and opens holes for attacks only if the basic rules of data validation and data checking are not enforced. But this, you understand, is a more general problem when you're trying to write secure code.
The view state internal implementation is quite complex and layered enough to discourage attacks. Encryption is the most important element in protecting view state information.
In order to make the view state more secure, the ASP.NET #Page directive supports an attribute called EnableViewStateMac whose only purpose is detecting any possible attempt at corrupting original data.
If EnableViewStateMac is True, then when the page posts back the encrypted view state is algorithmically checked to verify that it has not been tampered with on the client. The net effect is that you might be able to read the contents of the view state, but to replace it you need the encryption key, which is in the Web server's LSA.
I am using jQuery with ASP.NET in a project. Instead of using ASP.NET Ajax, I am using jquery's ajax functions. Is there any security risk if I do that? I mean, since I am using jquery's ajax calls, no view state information will be passed to the server so that it can verify the page's authenticity (though it saves a lot of bandwidth..).
I would also like to know what is the best/good practice here.
Microsoft has included Jquery in their Visual Studio releases (see: http://weblogs.asp.net/scottgu/archive/2008/09/28/jquery-and-microsoft.aspx)
If there was a big security risk they probably wouldn't have done that ;)
As with al webapplications never trust the input you recieve. It doesn;t matter if you're working with ASP.Net AJAX, Jquery or any other library. Web requests can always be spoofed. Therefor always sanitize the input you recieve and make sure that the user is authenticated (ASP.Net forms authentication uses cookies and not viewstate).
Make sure that you validate all user input. And post basic authentication information to your Web Services (jQuery.ajax has a data parameter), so that no one can use the services without being a part of the system.
Passing along a session GUID and thus providing the Web Service with full authentication, is enough security for most applications (in addition to normal security checks such as input validation). You may specify closer what security level your application needs.
I use the same practice on many case - jQuery ajax on aspx pages
You can check 3 thinks (select 1-2 of them) and be sure that none can create troubles on your site.
Send all the post data encrypted (if you can).
Send hash value with the post data - and check for the correction of the hash (if you can).
Check that the calls is coming from your host on url.
eg, you have a page 'http://www.yourhost.com/askforajax.aspx',
check if the url starting with the 'http://www.yourhost.com/'
The hash I mean here, must be your implimation of hash or crc check or what ever you like you can call it.
here is a real ajax call from my pages
doSomeWork.aspx?plist=36&pslst=1&e=1202638085&er=12585795
The last 2 parametres are check parametres.
Also inside the the ajax page that make the calculations check every parameter for be correct.
I also check some other thinks in some cases, for example if a user press a button that make a change somewhere this user must have cookies enabled, so I check if the users cookie hash is the same.
For the url check
I belive that the Request.ServerVariables["HTTP_REFERER"], can do the work of checking from where the request come from.
HTTP_REFERER Returns a string containing the URL of the page that referred the request to the current page using an tag. If the page is redirected, HTTP_REFERER is empty
Hope this help you.