I am looking to expand trust within our application by setting up mutual TLS between the customer and our service.
In order to do this, I am thinking of asking the customer for their certificate and then I will cross-sign it with our own intermediate (AWS private CA)
I was thinking of providing the customer with the cross signed certificate which they will use to communicate securely to our services.
A couple of questions
Would it be too much hassle for a customer to provide their certificate? Is there a way to automate this?
2.Does my process on achieving this sound correct? Is this standard mTLS?
Trying to wrap my head around this stuff as I am kinda new to this tech.
Related
Sorry no code here because I am looking for a better idea or if I am on the right track?
I have two websites, lets call them A and B.
A is a website exposed to the internet and only users with valid account can access.
B is a internal (intranet) website with (Windows authentication using Active directory). I want Application B (intranet) to create users for Application A.
Application A is using the inbuilt ASP.NET JWT token authentication.
My idea is to expose a Api on the extranet website (A) and let (B) access this API. I can use CORS to make sure only (B) has access to the end point but I am not sure if this is a good enough protection? We will perform security penetrations test from a third party company so this might fail the security test?
Or
I can use entity framework to a update the AspnetUsers table manually. Not idea if this is feasible or the right way or doing things.
Any other solution?
In my opinion, don't expose your internal obligations with external solutions like implementing APIs etc ...
Just share the database to be accessible for B. In this way, the server administration is the only security concern and nobody knows how you work. In addition, It's not important how you implement the user authentication for each one (whether Windows Authentication or JWT) and has an independent infrastructure.
They are multiple solution to this one problem. It then end it really depends on your specific criteria.
You could go with:
B (intranet) website, reaching into the database and creating user as needed.
A (internet) website, having an API exposing the necessary endpoint to create user.
A (internet) website, having data migration running every now and then to insert users.
But they all comes with there ups and downs, I'll try to break them down for you.
API solution
Ups:
Single responsibility, you have only one piece of code touching this database which makes it easier to mitigate side effect
it is "future proof" you could easily have more services using this api.
Downs:
Attack surface increased, the API is on a public so subject to 3rd parties trying to play with it.
Maintain API as the database model changes (one more piece to maintain)
Not the fastest solution to implement.
Database direct access
Ups:
Attack surface minimal.
Very quick to develop
Downs:
Database model has to be maintained twice
migration + deployment have to be coordinated, hard to maintain.
Make the system more error prone.
Migration on release
Ups:
Cheapest to develop
Highest performance on inserts
Downs:
Not flexible
Very slow for user
Many deployment
Manual work (will be costly over time)
In my opinion I suggest you go for the API, secure the API access with OAuth mechanism. It OAuth is too time consuming to put in place. Maybe you can try some easier Auth protocols.
I'm thinking of using an MBaaS such as Firebase or Kinvey for my next app, and am wondering if any exist which encrypt application data end-to-end (i.e. such that the encryption keys are never shared with the service provider). This seems feasible in theory, since the server is not expected to do any computation on the data, only store it and deliver it to clients.
Does such a service exist? I've found ZeroDB and Crypton, but neither are available as services AFAICT, which means I'd have to administer, scale, and back them up myself. I also thought of using something like Firebase and encrypting my app's data before I pass it to the Firebase API, but I'm wary of writing a one-off crypto layer like that unless I have to (i.e. I'd rather use something that's been peer-reviewed).
Alternatively, if no such service currently exists, why not? Is it technically infeasible, or is there just no market for it?
Edit: This seems closest to what I'm looking for, but considering the broken links on their website I'm guessing it's defunct: Adreneline Mobility
The answer to your question is actually available on the market. CloudMine offers end-to-end encryption (disclosure - I work at CloudMine). They have a largely healthcare focused offering so it has to stand up to HIPAA and other government regs around data security.
Here's a good overview video on security featuring CloudMine's CTO. The first 45 sec. provide some more information on our encryption techniques.
I know I'm being the "sales guy" right now but I'm happy to hop on a call to share what we've built and discuss your specific use case. You can email me at nick at cloudmineinc.com if you're interested.
Virgil Security (full disclosure - I work there) has an end-to-end encryption SDK that works for any endpoint, and also has a special integration with Firebase. It's open source, of course. Check it out and feel free to ask any questions of the team here or on Slack - https://e3kit.readme.io/
I'm totally new to SAML. I want implement SSO for my ASP.NET Website. I got the SAML assertion from my client. I would like to know what are all other requirements I need to get it from my client and what setup I need to implement at my end.
Can anybody help me out in this.
Thanks in advance.
The first thing that I would do is avoid writing the SAML code yourself. There's plenty out there. #Woloski (above) has some. My company has some (I work for the company that makes PingFederate). There's some open source stuff, too. I've seen good connections from KentorIT authServices. If this is your first foray into SAML, then my bet is that ADFS is way overboard. I'll be honest, the groups we see most commonly at Ping is when they decide to go "all in" with SSO. The first one or two connections are easy. Tehn it becomes a management nightmare rapidly thereafter. The reason I say to avoid writing your own, is because there are a LOT of nuances to SAML, with massive pitfalls, and headaches you just don't need.
As the service provider (SP), you need to tell your client (Identity Provider, or IdP) what "attributes" you need from them to properly connect their users to their account in your application (maybe a username?). In addition, you can ask for additional attributes to ensure their profile is up to date - phone number, email, etc. It's up to the two of you to determine what you need (and what they'll give you). Obviously, they shouldn't send social security number, if you have no need for it.
You also need to decide if you will do SP initiated SSO (will the users get links to documents deep inside your app?), or if just IdP initiated (Or will always just come to the front door?) will suffice. What about Single Logout? Do you (or they) want to do that? [Personally, I suggest NO, but that's a different topic]
What about signing the assertion? Your cert or theirs? If you're doing SP-init, do you need to use their cert or yours for signing the AuthnRequest? Do you need encryption of the assertion, or maybe just a few of the attributes?
Generally, you do all of this with a "metadata exchange". You give them your metadata that says "this is what we need". They import that metadata to build a new connection, fulfilling the attributes your app needs with calls to their LDAP or other user repository, as well as doing authentication (if required). They finish building their connection, and export THEIR metadata, which you import to build your connection (thereby making sure you all agree on certificates). You hook it to your app, and away you go.
I make this sound easy. It is, and it isn't. Rolling your own can mean issues. Lots of them. With some being so minute that it takes pros hours (and days) to see it. When it works, it works, and well.
HTH -- Andy
you can use something like ADFS to accepto SAML Assertions. ADFS gets installed on Windows 2008 or 2012.
You would need to ask your customer
the signing certificate public key and
the sign in URL.
Then you would create a "Claims Provider Trust" in ADFS and enter those details. Then a "Relying Party Trust" that represents your application. Finally you would have to configure your application with ADFS using WIF. This blog post have more details:
http://thedotnethub.blogspot.com.ar/2012/12/adfs-20-by-example-part1-adfs-as-ip-sts.html
Also you can use Auth0 to accomplish the same without setting up any software on your side (disclaimer: I work there).
I have a general question about database hosting in relation to WCF and ASP.NET. We are currently developing a new online web application in ASP.NET, which gets/posts data to our MSSQL database with a WCF service (three tier infrastructure).
Now later in development we will be launching our website and hosting it on an external provider. We are unsure whether to keep the database for the website internally on our own servers, or host it externally along with our provider (they offer database hosting options as well).
If we hosted it externally, we would obviously back it up internally using batch scripts etc.
One major concern is the security of the database, as we are only a small business with not much experience in web security architecture. Due to this, we are leaning towards an external provider for both the website and database, who would obviously have experience and the equipment to manage such things.
Could you please offer some opinions on the matter?
Thanks!
There's always a risk associated with handing sensitive data off to an outside party, and trusting them to be as secure as you need.
There's no mystery here, someone at the provider will have enough access to look at your data if they really wanted to. So it all boils down to how sensitive is your data? Is there bank account info or social security numbers? For these reasons, our company cannot hand off such data to an outside party.
I'm a little confused though about one thing: if you could potentially host the database server when you go to production, why couldn't you host the website as well? Is it a matter of being able to handle high traffic?
Update in response to your comment:
It sounds like your data is somewhat sensitive, not highly sensitive. In which case if we're not being totally bonkers pedantic here, then you can reasonably assume a reputable hosting company will take the proper measures to secure your data, and from the sounds of it, they're probably more capable in this respect then your own company (not because you're careless or wet behind the ears, just because they would have considerable experience in this area where your company does not).
Now for the performance and hardware setup part if your comment... if you dont have the hardware or network infrastructure to meet your requirements, then you either a) upgrade your own infrastructure and hire the appropriate personnel to set it up and maintain it or b) you pay someone else to do it. Sounds like a no-brainer for you guys to go with option b.
Some web applications, like Google Docs, store data generated by the users. Data that can only be read by its owner. Or maybe not?
As far as I know, this data is stored as is in a remote database. So, if anybody with enough privileges in the remote system (a sysadmin, for instance) can lurk my data, my privacy could get compromised.
What could be the best solution to store this data encrypted in a remote database and that only the data's owner could decrypt it? How to make this process transparent to the user? (You can't use the user's password as the key to encrypt his data, because you shouldn't know his password).
If encryption/decryption is performed on the server, there is no way you can make sure that the cleartext is not dumped somewhere in some log file or the like.
You need to do the encryption/decryption inside the browser using JavaScript/Java/ActiveX or whatever. As a user, you need to trust the client-side of the web service not to send back the info unencrypted to the server.
Carl
I think Carl, nailed it on the head, but I wanted to say that with any website, if you are providing it any confidential/personal/privileged information then you have to have a certain level of trust, and it is the responsibility of the service provider to establish this trust. This is one of those questions that has been asked many times, across the internet since it's inception, and it will only continue to grow until we all have our own SSL certs encoded on our fingerprint, and even then we will have to ask the question 'How do I know that the finger is still attached to the user?'.
Well, I'd consider a process similar to Amazons AWS. You authenticate with a private password that is not saved remotely. Just a hash is used to validate the user. Then you generate a certificate with one of the main and long-tested algorithms and provide this from a secure page. Then a public/private key algorithm can be used to encrypt things for the users.
But the main problem remains the same: If someone with enough privileges can access the data (say: hacked your server), you're lost. Given enough time and power, everything could be breaked. It's just a matter of time.
But I think algorithms and applications like GPG/PGP and similar are very well known and can be implemented in a way that secure web applications - and keep the usability at a score that the average user can handle.
edit I want to catch up with #Carl and Unkwntech and add their statement: If you don't trust the site itself, don't give private data away. That's even before someone hacks their servers... ;-)
Auron asked: How do you generate a key for the client to encrypt/decrypt the data? Where do you store this key?
Well, the key is usually derived from some password the user has chosen. You don't store it, you trust the user to remember it. What you can store is maybe some salt value associated to that user, to increase security against rainbow-table attacks for instance.
Crypto is hard to get right ;-) I would recommend to look at the source code for AxCrypt and for Xecrets' off-line client.
Carl
No, you can't use passwords, but you could use password hashes. However, Google Docs are all about sharing, so such a method would require storing a copy of the document for each user.