I'm new in cryptography and I attended a session that talks about the digital signature, and the speaker said that in some cases we need to generate the "HMAC Hash" then sign it with my private key.
Question: isn't it enough to sign the hash of the message without using "HMAC" (just the hash) with my private key?
I think it is enough to validate that no one but me can generate this message, so it should verify the data integrity also as the hash is covered with my private key encryption "signature" and finally, it should save non-repudiation as well.
So, is there any case that can cause a vulnerability if we use the hashing algorithm without HMAC in order to keep authenticity, data integrity and non-repudiation?
I understand that when sending a message, the message is encrypted with a public key and sent over, requiring a private key to open the encrypted message. However I wonder how both clients know the private keys. For example:
John sends a message to Alice saying "Hello World".
The message get's encrypted with a public key, and sent
Alice decrypts it with a private key.
But, how does Alice's computer know the private key, how does it get there, does it come with the encrypted message in another layer of encryption, or is it on both of the computer at the start, but how?
I am just wondering, and it would be great if anyone can please explain thanks!
Both parties generate their own private keys that stay with them. The public portion of these keys are then distributed to other parties that want to communicate with the owner of the private key.
The important part is ensuring that you are communicating with who you think you are communicating with, otherwise the middle-man could send his public key to both parties masquerading as the intended recipient.
This answer does, to some degree, assume we are talking about RSA. There are many asymmetric cryptosystems that use private/public keys that may not necessarily make sense with the terminology I've used.
In the simplest model:
Alice generates a keypair Apub / Apriv.
Bob doesn't need keys if this is RSA.
Alice sends Apub to Bob. She does this securely (exercise left to the reader).
Bob encrypts some data using Apub.
Bob sends his encrypted stuff to Alice.
Alice knew a priori (simple scenario, remember?) which key was being used, and uses Apriv to recover the data.
In more complex models entities may have many private keys. Aside from "try all of them" we can add some structure.
Alice generates a keypair Apub / Apriv. She saves these securely (exercise left to the reader).
Alice obtains an X.509 Public Key Certificate with Apub as the subject public key.
Self signed is fine here, or CA-issued is always good.
Bob still is a happy man who doesn't need to manage keys. That makes his FISMA/PCI/etc compliance audits easier.
Alice sends her certificate to Bob. She does this securely (ELTTR).
Bob (uses software which) extracts Apub from the certificate and encrypts data using it.
Bob('s software) builds a formatted message which includes a way to identify which certificate was used, and what the encrypted content is.
Maybe he just sends the whole cert back. (Probably not)
Maybe he sends the certificate Issuer Name and Serial Number values.
Maybe he sends the Subject Key Identifier extension value from the cert.
He has lots of options, as long as Alice understands what he's doing.
Bob sends this formatted message to Alice.
Alice identifies which of her several certificates was addressed in the formatted message.
Alice has a key management system and can figure out which private key to use based on the certificate.
Alice uses Apriv to recover the data.
The more complex model is a simplistic form of Enveloped CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) on Bob's part. Alice read the message and used something like the Windows Certificate Store (which is capable of carrying identifiers to Windows Cryptographic Key Stores for private keys) to determine the certificate and ultimately the private key.
Lots of different things could be done at the "more complex" layer. If Alice really likes managing keys she could make a different key for each person she talks to, and then know from a messages "Bobness" or "Daviosity" that she should use the private key matching the public key she gave to Bob, or Dave.
John uses Alice's public key to encrypt. Alice is the only one with the private key able to decrypt. Alice then responds, encrypting with John's public key, to which John decrypts using his private key.
This is about a test I did, but I'm asking because I'd like to understand these concepts, I am a little confused about them.
Maria encrypts her document with her private key.
Maria sends the document to John
John decrypt the received document using Maria's public key.
I'd like to know whether this process provides:
1) authenticity
2) integrity
3) non-repudiation
4) confidentiality.
I would also like to know which of these 4 items are provided by certificates, and by digital-signature.
Thanks!
Authenticity You can use public-private key pairs for authentication in there own right, if I'm not mistake ssh does something similar. In fact you can setup servers in such away you do not need to enter a login password based on this principal.
Integrity
I don't believe that the public -private key on its own accounts for this on its own.
Non-repudiation
Cannot be acchieved on its own without have a certifying body saying that the owner of the private key to which you encrypted your public key is the origin you expect it to be. For more
click here
Confidentiality
the way it works is that you have public-private key pairs the 'public' have access to a key which they used to encrypt data but only one person has the private key to decrypt it. Therefore it brings about confidentiality only the intended person can read the data.
If I want to sign and encrypt a message using an X509 certificate, is there any reason not to use the same certificate for encryption and signing?
Update: Looking back, I think that this must be the most hair-brained question I ever asked on SO. I'm sorry.
The sender uses his own private key to sign a message. The message is encrypted with the recipient public key. A certificate contains a public key. Presumably, the sender public key (corresponding to the sender private key used for signing the message) is also represented in a certificate.
The recipient uses his own private key (corresponding to the public key in his certificate) to decrypt the incoming message. The recipient uses the sender public key (from the sender certificate) to verify the signature.
That being said, you may envision a generic scenario where everybody can send and receive email. Therefore, everyone has a key pair (with public part in a certificate) which is used to encrypt and decrypt emails (Bob's public key is used to encrypt emails sent to Bob, and Bob uses the corresponding private key to decrypt them, i.e. to read the emails). Also, everyone has a key pair for signatures (Bob uses his private key to sign the messages that he sends, Alice uses Bob's public key to verify the signatures purportedly computed by Bob).
The question is then: will Bob have two key pairs (one for encryption/decryption, and one for signature/verification), or only one key pair which is used for both jobs ?
It so happens that the RSA public encryption algorithm and the RSA signature algorithm can use the same kind of key, called (quite logically) "RSA keys". So this is doable, and actually it happens quite often.
However, generally speaking, signature keys and encryption keys have distinct life cycles and management procedures. In a business context, the direction keeps in a safe a copy of all private keys used for encryption, because losing an encryption key means losing data. And employees can become "unavailable" (employee is fired, employee retires, employee is hit by a bus...). Conversely, when a signature key is lost, previously emitted signatures are still valid and verifiable, so one simply has to create a new key pair to be able to produce other signatures. Besides, digital signatures may get a strong legal status only if there is no copy of the key in a safe somewhere. So the general advice is to keep encryption and signature keys separate. Using the same key for both is an approximation which may have unwanted side-effects (such as data loss or lack of legal value). Depending on the context, this may or may not be a problem.
An X509 certificate contains a public key. To encrypt, you use the recipient's public key presumably obtained from their certificate. To sign, you use your private key, presumably from a secure store. The recipient verifies the signature using your public key, presumably from your certificate. Those are the basics.
Closed. This question does not meet Stack Overflow guidelines. It is not currently accepting answers.
This question does not appear to be about programming within the scope defined in the help center.
Closed 1 year ago.
Improve this question
What is the difference between encrypting some data vs signing some data (using RSA)?
Does it simply reverse the role of the public-private keys?
For example, I want to use my private key to generate messages so only I can possibly be the sender. I want my public key to be used to read the messages and I do not care who reads them. I want to be able to encrypt certain information and use it as a product-key for my software. I only care that I am the only one who can generate these. I would like to include my public key in my software to decrypt/read the signature of the key. I do not care who can read the data in the key, I only care that I am the only verifiable one who can generate them.
Is signing useful in this scenario?
When encrypting, you use their public key to write a message and they use their private key to read it.
When signing, you use your private key to write message's signature, and they use your public key to check if it's really yours.
I want to use my private key to generate messages so only I can possibly be the sender.
I want my public key to be used to read the messages and I do not care who reads them
This is signing, it is done with your private key.
I want to be able to encrypt certain information and use it as a product key for my software.
I only care that I am the only one who can generate these.
If you only need to know it to yourself, you don't need to mess with keys to do this. You may just generate random data and keep it in a database.
But if you want people to know that the keys are really yours, you need to generate random data, keep in it a database AND sign it with your key.
I would like to include my public key in my software to decrypt/read the signature of the key.
You'll probably need to purchase a certificate for your public key from a commercial provider like Verisign or Thawte, so that people may check that no one had forged your software and replaced your public key with theirs.
In RSA crypto, when you generate a key pair, it's completely arbitrary which one you choose to be the public key, and which is the private key. If you encrypt with one, you can decrypt with the other - it works in both directions.
So, it's fairly simple to see how you can encrypt a message with the receiver's public key, so that the receiver can decrypt it with their private key.
A signature is proof that the signer has the private key that matches some public key. To do this, it would be enough to encrypt the message with that sender's private key, and include the encrypted version alongside the plaintext version. To verify the sender, decrypt the encrypted version, and check that it is the same as the plaintext.
Of course, this means that your message is not secret. Anyone can decrypt it, because the public key is well known. But when they do so, they have proved that the creator of the ciphertext has the corresponding private key.
However, this means doubling the size of your transmission - plaintext and ciphertext together (assuming you want people who aren't interested in verifying the signature, to read the message). So instead, typically a signature is created by creating a hash of the plaintext. It's important that fake hashes can't be created, so cryptographic hash algorithms such as SHA-2 are used.
So:
To generate a signature, make a hash from the plaintext, encrypt it with your private key, include it alongside the plaintext.
To verify a signature, make a hash from the plaintext, decrypt the signature with the sender's public key, check that both hashes are the same.
There are two distinct but closely related problems in establishing a secure communication
Encrypt data so that only authorized persons can decrypt and read it.
Verify the identity/authentication of sender.
Both of these problems can be elegantly solved using public key cryptography.
I. Encryption and decryption of data
Alice wants to send a message to Bob which no one should be able to read.
Alice encrypts the message with Bob's public key and sends it over.
Bob receives the message and decrypts it using his private Key.
Note that if A wants to send a message to B, A needs to use the Public
key of B (which is publicly available to anyone) and neither public
nor private key of A comes into picture here.
So if you want to send a message to me you should know and use my public key which I provide to you and only I will be able to decrypt the message since I am the only one who has access to the corresponding private key.
II. Verify the identity of sender (Authentication)
Alice wants to send a message to Bob again. The problem of encrypting the data is solved using the above method.
But what if I am sitting between Alice and Bob, introducing myself as 'Alice' to Bob and sending my own message to Bob instead of forwarding the one sent by Alice. Even though I can not decrypt and read the original message sent by Alice(that requires access to Bob's private key) I am hijacking the entire conversation between them.
Is there a way Bob can confirm that the messages he is receiving are actually sent by Alice?
Alice signs the message with her private key and sends it over. (In practice, what is signed is a hash of the message, e.g. SHA-256 or SHA-512.)
Bob receives it and verifies it using Alice's public key. Since Alice's public key successfully verified the message, Bob can conclude that the message has been signed by Alice.
Yeah think of signing data as giving it your own wax stamp that nobody else has. It is done to achieve integrity and non-repudiation. Encryption is so no-one else can see the data. This is done to achieve confidentiality. See wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_security#Key_concepts
A signature is a hash of your message signed using your private key.
Signing is producing a "hash" with your private key that can be verified with your public key. The text is sent in the clear.
Encrypting uses the receiver's public key to encrypt the data; decoding is done with their private key.
So, the use of keys is not reversed (otherwise your private key wouldn't be private anymore!).
You are describing exactly how and why signing is used in public key cryptography. Note that it's very dangerous to sign (or encrypt) aritrary messages supplied by others - this allows attacks on the algorithms that could compromise your keys.
Signing indicates you really are the source or vouch for of the object signed. Everyone can read the object, though.
Encrypting means only those with the corresponding private key can read it, but without signing there is no guarantee you are behind the encrypted object.
Functionally, you use public/private key encryption to make certain only the receiver can read your message. The message is encrypted using the public key of the receiver and decrypted using the private key of the receiver.
Signing you can use to let the receiver know you created the message and it has not changed during transfer. Message signing is done using your own private key. The receiver can use your public key to check the message has not been tampered.
As for the algorithm used: that involves a one-way function see for example wikipedia. One of the first of such algorithms use large prime-numbers but more one-way functions have been invented since.
Search for 'Bob', 'Alice' and 'Mallory' to find introduction articles on the internet.
What is the difference between encrypting some data vs signing some data (using RSA)?
Encryption preserves confidentiality of the message ("some data"), while signing provides non-repudiation: i.e. only the entity that signed it could have signed it. There are functional differences as well; read on.
Does it simply reverse the role of the public-private keys?
Absolutely not. The use of the same private keys for signing and decryption (or, likewise, the same public keys for verification and encryption) is frowned upon, as you should not mix purposes. This is not so much a mathematical issue (RSA should still be secure), but a problem with key management, where e.g. the signing key should have a shorter live and contain more protection before it is used.
For the same message, you should use the senders private key for signing and the receivers trusted public key for encryption. Commonly sign-then-encrypt is used otherwise an adversary could replace the signature with his own. Likewise you should use the private key of the receiver for decryption and the trusted public key of the sender for verification.
Furthermore, you should understand that signature generation doesn't use "encryption with the private key". Although all RSA operations are based upon modular exponentiation, the padding scheme is entirely different for signature generation. Furthermore, the public key has entirely different properties than the RSA private key in all practical uses of RSA.
For example, I want to use my private key to generate messages so only I can possibly be the sender.
That's non-repudiation property, which can be achieved by signing.
I want my public key to be used to read the messages and I do not care who reads them.
The public key should be considered known by all. If you want everybody to read the messages, then you simply do not encrypt them.
Signing will generally not influence the content of the message. The message is is considered separate from signatures. Officially such signatures are known as "signatures with appendix" where the appendix is the message. It's a bit weird name as the message is considered more important than the signature over it, but yeah. Only few signatures offer (partial) message recovery; they are not used much anymore and are generally considered deprecated.
Note that signature protocols such as CMS may deploy a container format that includes both the message and the signature. In that case you'd need first get the - still unencrypted - message out of the container, much like unzipping a file from a plain .zip archive. So the message may be hidden from view and cannot be directly used in that case.
I want to be able to encrypt certain information and use it as a product-key for my software. I only care that I am the only one who can generate these.
Encryption is used to achieve confidentiality. In the past RSA signature generation was often thought of as "encryption with the private key". However, the operations are quite different as explained above, and the later standards desperately try and separate encryption and signature generation.
I would like to include my public key in my software to decrypt/read the signature of the key. I do not care who can read the data in the key, I only care that I am the only verifiable one who can generate them.
Yes, this is called establishing trust in the public key. However, protecting your program code is very different from protecting messages. You can perform code signing but then you'd need something to check the signature outside of your code. There are operating systems that offer this.
There is Microsoft Authenticode for instance. Application stores like the iStore and Android app store may or may not use code signing, but they offer some reassurance that your application isn't cloned or at least not cloned within the store. Cryptography is not always the solution after all.
Keeping your code from being cloned / altered at all is much harder, and you'd be solidly in DRM territory if you go that way.
Is signing useful in this scenario?
Yes, absolutely. It can certainly help making sure that the messages were only signed by you, if there is trust in the public key. If it can be helpful for authenticating your application code / integrated public key depends entirely on the environment that you expect to run the code in.
In your scenario, you do not encrypt in the meaning of asymmetric encryption; I'd rather call it "encode".
So you encode your data into some binary representation, then you sign with your private key. If you cannot verify the signature via your public key, you know that the signed data is not generated with your private key. ("verification" meaning that the unsigned data is not meaningful)
Answering this question in the content that the questioners intent was to use the solution for software licensing, the requirements are:
No 3rd party can produce a license key from decompiling the app
The content of the software key does not need to be secure
Software key is not human readable
A Digital Signature will solve this issue as the raw data that makes the key can be signed with a private key which makes it not human readable but could be decoded if reverse engineered. But the private key is safe which means no one will be able to make licenses for your software (which is the point).
Remember you can not prevent a skilled person from removing the software locks on your product. So if they have to hack each version that is released. But you really don't want them to be able to generate new keys for your product that can be shared for all versions.
Python
The PyNaCl documentation has an example of 'Digital Signature' which will suite the purpose. http://pynacl.readthedocs.org/en/latest/signing/
and of cause NaCl project to C examples
What is the difference between encrypting some data vs signing some data (using RSA)?
RSA merely the only public-key cryptosystem that naively supports both public-key encryption and digital signatures.
This usually confuses beginners since various sources/lecturers that say
RSA decryption is the RSA signature.
No, it is not!
The confusing comes from the textbook RSA
the textbook RSA encryption;
message m and calculates c = m^e mod n for encryption and m = c^d mod n for the decryption.
the textbook RSA signatures;
message m and calculates sg = m^d mod n for verification and m == sg^e mod n for the signature verification.
Both are not secure and they are not used in the real-life!
Does it simply reverse the role of the public-private keys?
No, it is not!
Encryption
For RSA encryption one must be using either RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding or Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP). These paddings have overhead to the message. For example, PKCS1-v1_5 defined as
It has an EM structure as this
EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M.
so what are they;
PS is at least eight FFs block
M is the message
the first 0x00 guarantees that EM is less than the modulus.
The rest details like the size of FF block etc. can be found in rfc 8017 section 7.2.1
So it has a special message structure to be secure which is proven to be secure very lately (2018). The padding has at least 11-byte overhead.
Signature
The correct term for signature is signing and verification. For secure signing, RSA needs RSA-PSS (Probabilistic signature scheme). The structure is a bit complex, a picture will tell most of it
Once you hash the message and properly padded, then you can use your private key to sign your padded message!
For the verification, use the public key on the signed message and verify using the padding rules.
Prefer OAEP since RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 hard to implement correctly and those incorrect implementations caused many attacks over the year despite that is is proven to be secure.
Let finish all with the Cornell University page;
RSA Signing is Not RSA Decryption