What if I want to authenticate user using Stored Procedure using ADO.Net? Is there any way to do this or directly authenticate or find other way?
You can use database collation for your idea.
you must use SQL_Latic1_General_CP1_CS_AS instead of you must use SQL_Latic1_General_CP1_CI_AS
Also you can apply your collation on the special columns.
For example :
CREATE TABLE yourtable
(Name NvarChar(100) COLLATE SQL_Latic1_General_CP1_CI_AS, ...
Related
I'm writing an R Shiny/SQLite app. In the app, I have a function that returns a column from one of the tables in my SQLite database, with the function taking the table name as an input.
Before sending the query to SQLite, the function checks that the table name equals one of the table names that the user is allowed to access. However, I am not using a parameterized query, because the term I'm changing is not a variable used for comparison but the name of the table to extract information from. (There might be a way to make this work anyway with a parameterized search, I suppose.)
My question is whether this is safe from an SQL injection? Can the query be altered on its way from the server to the database, or only from an alteration in the ui input to the server?
(Bear with me, I am new to SQLite.)
Assuming your query is being concatenated as follows:
tbl <- "yourTable"
sql <- paste0("select * from ", tbl, " where some_col = 1")
Then there should be no chance of SQL injection, assuming you check the incoming table name and verify that it matches a table name in your whitelist. Note that this step is critical here to keeping things safe. Let's say that you didn't sterilize the incoming table name. Then, consider this:
tbl <- "yourTable; delete from yourTable"
This would result in the following query being submitted for execution:
select * from yourTable; delete from yourTable where some_col = 1;
Assuming your SQLite driver allows multiple SQL statements to execute, the above hack/trick might end up deleting data from a large portion of one of your tables.
So, your approach should be safe provided that you check the table name. Note that strictly speaking the table name itself is not a parameter in a parameterized query. Rather, only the literal values in the query are parameters.
SQL query parameters cannot be used in place of a table name anyway, so comparing the table name to a list of known authorized tables is your only option.
Yes, it is safe. If you're in control of the set of values that can be interpolated into the SQL query, then you can prevent unauthorized SQL injection.
Note that some other elements of SQL queries cannot be parameters:
Any identifier, e.g. a table name, column name, or schema name.
Expressions
Lists of values in an IN ( ... ) predicate. Use one parameter per value in the list.
SQL keywords.
A query parameter can be used only in place of a single scalar value. That is, where you would use a quoted string literal, quoted date literal, or numeric literal.
The problem of SQL injection is only the user input. Nothing happens to the query on its way from the server to the database (well a malware could in theory alter it, but then even a parametrized query wouldn't help).
I.e., if you create a SQL string like this (C#):
sql = "SELECT * FROM " + tableName;
Then a user might enter a tableName like
MyTable; DROP TABLE MyTable
Guess what happens.
So, if you check the table name, you are on the safe side.
net MVC application using EF6
and would like searching for "O" to return matches containing "Ø"
I am using the default collation in MSSQL Server at the moment.
Do I have to change the collation or add some code?
thanks
That's called normalization.
E.g. køpenhavn could be written as
køpenhavn
kopenhavn
koepenhavn
So from a plain-sql you could query
select ...
where col1='kopenhavn'
or col1=replace('kopenhavn','o','ø')
or col1=replace('kopenhavn','o','oe')
or
select ...
where col1='kopenhavn' COLLATE SQL_Latin1_General_CP1253_CI_AI
(returns only 2 of 3).
The Entity Framework does support a COLLATE clause, but LINQ to SQL does not.
changing the collation
ALTER TABLE Resource ALTER COLUMN FirstName
nvarchar(50)COLLATE Latin1_General_CI_AI;
worked
I have an existing database where they created theiw own unicode collation sequence. I'm trying to use the following code and get a "no such collation sequence" exception. Can anybdy hlep with the the syntax to use "collate nocase" with this code?
update Songs set
SongPath = replace (SongPath, 'Owner.Funkytown', 'Jim');
Dump database (via shell), edit output SQL (find and change column definitions, set COLLATION NOCASE). Recreate database.
I is there a way to add "additional info" to a sqlite database. Something like date of creation of a database, amount of entries or name of user who created it. If I don't want to create special tables in order to store all this info especially if there will only be one of each type.
Thank you in advance.
Why not use one special table and store each special value as a name-value pair?
CREATE TABLE SpecialInfoKeyValues (
Key VARCHAR UNIQUE COLLATE NOCASE,
Value
);
Since SQLite uses "manifest typing," you can store any kind of value you want in there.
In short, no. SQLite has no concept of users, and doesn't store creation metadata.
No, there is no way to do that, you will have to use a "special" table to carry data within the file, or you will have to use external means.
There are, however, two version counters stored within the database itself: the schema_version and the user_version (see Pragmas to query/modify version values for details.) Perhaps you could abuse those. Please keep in mind, though, that by default the sqlite3 shell application does not store those when you use the .dump command to dump the database into a textual representation.
I've been preaching both to my colleagues and here on SO about the goodness of using parameters in SQL queries, especially in .NET applications. I've even gone so far as to promise them as giving immunity against SQL injection attacks.
But I'm starting to wonder if this really is true. Are there any known SQL injection attacks that will be successfull against a parameterized query? Can you for example send a string that causes a buffer overflow on the server?
There are of course other considerations to make to ensure that a web application is safe (like sanitizing user input and all that stuff) but now I am thinking of SQL injections. I'm especially interested in attacks against MsSQL 2005 and 2008 since they are my primary databases, but all databases are interesting.
Edit: To clarify what I mean by parameters and parameterized queries. By using parameters I mean using "variables" instead of building the sql query in a string.
So instead of doing this:
SELECT * FROM Table WHERE Name = 'a name'
We do this:
SELECT * FROM Table WHERE Name = #Name
and then set the value of the #Name parameter on the query / command object.
Placeholders are enough to prevent injections. You might still be open to buffer overflows, but that is a completely different flavor of attack from an SQL injection (the attack vector would not be SQL syntax but binary). Since the parameters passed will all be escaped properly, there isn't any way for an attacker to pass data that will be treated like "live" SQL.
You can't use functions inside placeholders, and you can't use placeholders as column or table names, because they are escaped and quoted as string literals.
However, if you use parameters as part of a string concatenation inside your dynamic query, you are still vulnerable to injection, because your strings will not be escaped but will be literal. Using other types for parameters (such as integer) is safe.
That said, if you're using use input to set the value of something like security_level, then someone could just make themselves administrators in your system and have a free-for-all. But that's just basic input validation, and has nothing to do with SQL injection.
No, there is still risk of SQL injection any time you interpolate unvalidated data into an SQL query.
Query parameters help to avoid this risk by separating literal values from the SQL syntax.
'SELECT * FROM mytable WHERE colname = ?'
That's fine, but there are other purposes of interpolating data into a dynamic SQL query that cannot use query parameters, because it's not an SQL value but instead a table name, column name, expression, or some other syntax.
'SELECT * FROM ' + #tablename + ' WHERE colname IN (' + #comma_list + ')'
' ORDER BY ' + #colname'
It doesn't matter whether you're using stored procedures or executing dynamic SQL queries directly from application code. The risk is still there.
The remedy in these cases is to employ FIEO as needed:
Filter Input: validate that the data look like legitimate integers, table names, column names, etc. before you interpolate them.
Escape Output: in this case "output" means putting data into a SQL query. We use functions to transform variables used as string literals in an SQL expression, so that quote marks and other special characters inside the string are escaped. We should also use functions to transform variables that would be used as table names, column names, etc. As for other syntax, like writing whole SQL expressions dynamically, that's a more complex problem.
There seems to be some confusion in this thread about the definition of a "parameterised query".
SQL such as a stored proc that accepts parameters.
SQL that is called using the DBMS Parameters collection.
Given the former definition, many of the links show working attacks.
But the "normal" definition is the latter one. Given that definition, I don't know of any SQL injection attack that will work. That doesn't mean that there isn't one, but I have yet to see it.
From the comments, I'm not expressing myself clearly enough, so here's an example that will hopefully be clearer:
This approach is open to SQL injection
exec dbo.MyStoredProc 'DodgyText'
This approach isn't open to SQL injection
using (SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand("dbo.MyStoredProc", testConnection))
{
cmd.CommandType = CommandType.StoredProcedure;
SqlParameter newParam = new SqlParameter(paramName, SqlDbType.Varchar);
newParam.Value = "DodgyText";
.....
cmd.Parameters.Add(newParam);
.....
cmd.ExecuteNonQuery();
}
any sql parameter of string type (varchar, nvarchar, etc) that is used to construct a dynamic query is still vulnerable
otherwise the parameter type conversion (e.g. to int, decimal, date, etc.) should eliminate any attempt to inject sql via the parameter
EDIT: an example, where parameter #p1 is intended to be a table name
create procedure dbo.uspBeAfraidBeVeryAfraid ( #p1 varchar(64) )
AS
SET NOCOUNT ON
declare #sql varchar(512)
set #sql = 'select * from ' + #p1
exec(#sql)
GO
If #p1 is selected from a drop-down list it is a potential sql-injection attack vector;
If #p1 is formulated programmatically w/out the ability of the user to intervene then it is not a potential sql-injection attack vector
A buffer overflow is not SQL injection.
Parametrized queries guarantee you are safe against SQL injection. They don't guarantee there aren't possible exploits in the form of bugs in your SQL server, but nothing will guarantee that.
Your data is not safe if you use dynamic sql in any way shape or form because the permissions must be at the table level. Yes you have limited the type and amount of injection attack from that particular query, but not limited the access a user can get if he or she finds a way into the system and you are completely vunerable to internal users accessing what they shouldn't in order to commit fraud or steal personal information to sell. Dynamic SQL of any type is a dangerous practice. If you use non-dynamic stored procs, you can set permissions at the procesdure level and no user can do anything except what is defined by the procs (except system admins of course).
It is possible for a stored proc to be vulnerable to special types of SQL injection via overflow/truncation, see: Injection Enabled by Data Truncation here:
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms161953.aspx
Just remember that with parameters you can easily store the string, or say username if you don't have any policies, "); drop table users; --"
This in itself won't cause any harm, but you better know where and how that date is used further on in your application (e.g. stored in a cookie, retrieved later on to do other stuff.
You can run dynamic sql as example
DECLARE #SQL NVARCHAR(4000);
DECLARE #ParameterDefinition NVARCHAR(4000);
SELECT #ParameterDefinition = '#date varchar(10)'
SET #SQL='Select CAST(#date AS DATETIME) Date'
EXEC sp_executeSQL #SQL,#ParameterDefinition,#date='04/15/2011'