Is it possible to have somewhat like this in iCal?
ATTENDEE:RESPONDED-AT:20120728T050000Z:MAILTO:test#domain.com
The iCal spec does not seem to provide any means for tracking attendee response's datetime. However, when syncing with MS Outlook, it becomes a problem because Outlook will display you "Please respond" until you set its AppointmentItem.ReplyTime properly (in case if you're an attendee to event). Of course, I can set this to some arbitrary value (like the moment of creating the event), but it won't be too friendly to end users when they see this in user interface of Outlook.
Currently I'm trying to add RESPONDED-AT manually but I'm not sure other CalDAV/iCal clients won't clear it as it's non-standard.
Related
The background first:
I have an application where a logged-in user(employee) X can see a list of all other users (employees). If the logged-in user X is a manager (their designation), then they can also edit certain attributes of the users they manage. For example, the location, designation, and the department of the user being edited. It should be noted X can edit only those employees who report to him/her, which means there are users which X is not allowed to edit.
When X clicks on a user to edit it, they navigate to a page like http:myapp.com/dashboard/editUser/<ID_OF_THE_USER_BEING_EDITED>
Obviously, X can get smart and manually edit the URL and put in the id of a user they are NOT allowed to edit, so before loading the edit form I need to check whether X has the authorization to edit user Y.
if X is authorized to do so, then that page displays a form (with the current attributes of the users pre-filled in the appropriate fields) to edit the user. Else, I display an 'Access Denied' kind of message.
Right now I have created a very badly named temporary endpoint (/api/v1/maybe_edit_user/?jwt=<TOKEN>&userId=<USER_BEING_EDITED>).
This grotesque-looking endpoint does 2 things:
It extracts the currently logged-in user from the token, and checks whether it has the required access level to edit the user (passed through the GET parameter userId)
If yes, then it returns the current attributes (name, email, location, designation, and other stuff) in the response, which is then pre-filled in appropriate fields when the form is displayed.
Once X submits the form, a PUT request is sent to another endpoint (/api/v1/users/<USER_ID_OF_Y> PUT) and the user Y is updated.
While this works, I don't find it attractive. I am trying to learn to write better, cleaner, and more organized code that is compliant with the standards.
The best practices for REST suggest that all endpoints should be nouns. My endpoint, on the other hand, is not even a simple verb. It's a god-forsaken phrase at the very minimum.
So, the questions here are:
How should I name my endpoint.
Should I use a single endpoint to check for permission, AND fetching the attributes of the user being edited, like I am doing right now? Or should I break them into 2 separate endpoints?
The fact that there is an access control list is an unrelated concern; ignore it.
Resource identifier identify resources. Resources are generalizations of documents.
You want an identifier that is consistent with the production rules of RFC 3986, and it is often convenient (but not required) to choose spellings that enable leverage of URI Templates (RFC 6570), but otherwise the machines don't care.
That means you can choose a spelling that makes things easier for humans; you get to choose which humans get priority here.
it returns the current attributes (name, email, location, designation, and other stuff) in the response
That's your hint as to what the document is; some sort of digest of Bob's... profile? employee record? dossier? that is apparently optimized for use in this specific kind of form.
So the identifier could be as simple as
/this-specific-kind-of-form/source-data/Bob
and a request might look like
GET /this-specific-kind-of-form/source-data/Bob HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer <token>
The implementation looks largely like your sketch - verify the token, compare the claims to those that are required, and return either the resource or some flavor of Client Error (4xx).
The best practices for REST suggest that all endpoints should be nouns.
Don't read too much into that.
Notice that all of the following resource identifiers work:
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/get
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/post
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/put
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/patch
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/delete
You can click on any of those links, and your browser will create the correct HTTP request, and the server will do the expected thing.
How can I send a gel:email to multiple recipients? I have records with 3 email addresses in each and I want to send the same email to all 3.
This is my current code:
<core:forEach items="${getDetails.rows}" var="row">
<core:set value="${row.Manager_Email}" var="manager" />
<core:set value="${row.Delivery_Manager_Email}" var="deliveryManager" />
<core:set value="${row.Director_Email}" var="director" />
<core:choose>
<core:when test="${status == 1}">
<gel:email from="Clarity_Do-Not-Reply#gov.nl.ca" fromName="Clarity Administrator" to="${manager};${deliveryManager};${director}" subject="Notification: Project is due to finish within 7 days">
I've tried that and:
to="${manager;deliveryManager;director}"
Neither seem to work. The doc says they can be split with the ; but it doesn't seem to be working. What am I doing wrong?
Does it work with just one of them? I would start and establish that the mail server works in this environment. Choose one of those variables and print it out. If it's not what you are expecting then fix your query or wherever you are getting those bound variables. If it is correct then remove the other two recipients and establish that you can send an email successfully to just one of the recipients. If that works then continue troubleshooting.
If it doesn't work then you may discover that your mail server does not allow relaying, unauthenticated services or sending mail from a non-existent email account. You can start checking those things.
One of the issues with both the GEL email tag and the CORE email tag is that it doesn't support including the same email address twice. If you check your project you might find that the same resource is listed as both delivery manager and manager or director, etc. This is a problem for the tag.
You can get around this by placing all recipients into a data structure that doesn't allow duplicates (like a hash map/set) and then iterate them out back into a semi colon delimited String.
There are probably lots of examples of this type of thing on regoXchange, a huge repository of free GEL scripts and Clarity related customizations and development.
This approach that was in your original script example is the correct way to do it: to="${manager};${deliveryManager};${director}"
That is, using a single delimiter type (semi-colon in this case) to separate each evaluated variable value.
The style from your second attempt definitely will not work as ${manager;deliveryManager;director} is not a valid JEXL expression.
There are additional points to be aware of, such as:
Each of the values in the to attribute should not have anything else that can be mistaken for another delimiter type (e.g. no spaces or commas), as you may not mix and match.
Only use the email address directly, meaning some.one#somedomain.com and don't use forms like "One, Some" <some.one#somedomain.com>
Make sure none of the email addresses are duplicated in the list. Every address must be unique. As mentioned in the answer provided by #coda, you can filter duplicates out with some extra GEL or you can put the logic into your query (the row source) to de-duplicate.
If this is running in a SaaS environment, make sure none of the user addresses you are picking up are among the defaults for some built-in user accounts like username#mailserver.com or similar, as they have resulted in emails being filtered out before sending.
I am kind of new to ASP.NET.
I wonder is there any way to restrict user can only enter from a specify page?
Like, I have a Page A to let them enter some information, then when submit, I will use Response.Redirect to Page B. But I don't want the user can go into Page B directly from URL....
If I use Session, then if the user didn't close the browser to end the session, the another user can just go into Page B directly...
Because the computer that access to these pages is using by the public, so I want to see if there is anyway to make sure they only do one way process? Can't go back to previous or jump to another page.
Thanks in Advance.
If you control the other page, start a session and set a session variable to a value that can be reversed that only your server could (or should) create, much like serial keys. For example 72150166 because the sum of every second number equals the sum of every other number (7 + 1 + 0 + 6 = 2 + 5 + 1 + 6) but you could choose an algorithm as complex or as simple as you want. When the user navigates to the second page, check the session variable. This is not invincible security, but it is better than checking the referrer (especially since some browsers do not set it) and I imagine security based on coming from a certain page doesn't have to be that strict.
Edit: You should also add it to a database and link it with the particular user's IP so someone else can't use the same key.
You can use Request.UrlReferrer property in the Page Load of PageB to see which page is the request coming from. If the request is not coming from PageA then redirect the user to PageA.
Check this link for more information: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/system.web.httprequest.urlreferrer.aspx
Note: UrlReferrer is dependent on a request header and someone can set the header to mimic the request coming from PageA.
You could have the page that redirects send some sort of specifically generated hash/key in the query string that expires quickly and/or once viewed. This should be a lot more solid on the security side.
You will still need some way to store this key or value producing the hash so you can validate it on the receiving end- I would think your DB.
Should we guard against unanticipated user input from dropdown lists? Is it plausible to expect a user to somehow modify a dropdown list to contain values that weren't originally included?
How can they do this and how can we stop it?
Absolutely check for that.
Do something like this pseudo code on the receiving end:
if { posted_value is_element_of($array_of_your_choices) }
//processing code
else {
//prompt them for good input
}
So for example: Your dropdown list is of Primary Colors they'd like their house painted. You'd have (in PHP)
$colors = array('red', 'blue', 'yellow');
if in_array($_POST['color'], $colors)
{ //process this code! dispatch the painters; }
else {echo "sorry, that's not a real color";}
Edit: This is certainly possible. If your values are being submitted via a GET request, then the user can simply enter www.example.com/?price=0 to get a free house. If it's a POST request, it may seem a little more difficult, but it's really not:
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS,"price=0");
People could just use cURL to directly manipulate a POST request, in addition to a trivially large number of other clients.
A user can simply hand-write a HTTP request which has has filled in malicious data. For GET requests, for example, you may have a "State" dropdown that lists Alabama, Arkansas, etc. He may put http://example.com?state=evilstuff just simply into the browser url bar.
This is easily prevented since you already know exactly what is in the dropdown list. Simply checking to see if the input is in that list or not should be sufficient to prevent against injection-like attacks. If he puts in something other than a valid state name, throw an error.
This can only be done by modifying the HTTP response. So,
yes, it can be done and you need to safeguard against it (i.e. check if this can be a security threat and, if yes, validate the input), but
no, you don't need to bring a "nice" error message, since this cannot happen to a normal user "by accident".
When I'm bored, I edit drop-down lists in web sites just for fun. Mostly it just breaks the site, but at least once I could have gotten free or drastically reduced prices on tickets just by playing with the site's hidden fields. (Alas it was for a company I worked for, so I had to instead report the bug.)
Yes, a malicious user can submit data to your server without ever using your form, and could submit data that's not normally included in your dropdown list. This is a trivial form of attack that's often exploited in the real world.
Always check for valid input!
Some of the other answers are absolutely correct, you MUST validate on the server-side ANY data coming from the user side.
At work, we use tools such as the Firefix plug-in Tamper Data to manipulate and view data thats being posted to the server, after any client-side (javascript) validation has been done. Also, you can even use simple tools such as Firebug to visibly alter drop-down boxes to contain values that weren't put there by the server before submitting it.
I want find a platform/language agnostic solution to ensuring the origin of a FORM POST is from an expected source. I.e. Page1.aspx posting to Page2.php within the same web site.
Specifically what I am attempting to do here is to prevent request forgery.
Use a hidden field in your form, which contains a token your app generated. Store the token in the user session. When the form is submitted, your app will check that the value of the hidden field is identical to the value stored in the user session.
If it is identical, then you know the submitted form comes from where it is expected to come.
Old Thread, but might still be useful.
If you do not have session info set (best option) then you can include a hidden field with an encrypted timestamp then compare it (after de-crypt) to the current time on the process end to make sure it is relatively close and thus as recent as you deem necessary.
You could include into the form a hidden field which would be the SHA1Hash("some-secret" + Remote_IP + PerSessionSecret).
The PerSessionSecret is something you autogenerate in the beginning of the session. "some-secret" is a global secret value - which will help a little bit in case the randomly generated PerSessionSecret turns out not to be very random enough.
Then do the same calculation upon the form submission and you know it's most probably submitted from the same client that it was sent to. (Of course, if you have multiple clients behind the single address, like a proxy or a NAT, you can not distinguish between them reliably).