I plan to run the logged-in portion of my app in HTTPS, starting with from the log-in screen. Once the user is logged-in and continues his session entirely in HTTPS, how could a MITM attack be performed? Isn't this kind of attack dependent on figuring out what the two parties are saying?
I'm using asp.net with WCF services, and later will port to Azure.
Thanks.
If your login session is encrypted with HTTPS, then you're secure against MITM attacks. The client will send data to the server encrypted using the server's public key, which can only be decrypted with the server's private key. The client and server will then use this secure channel to agree on a secret key to use for their communication.
The MITM attacker cannot get at the private key because it's private. They can't present a certificate for the target domain because certificates can only be obtained from a CA, and (theoretically) the CAs your browser trusts won't sign a certificate for a domain unless they prove they own it. They can't get at the session key, so a MITM attack is impossible.
Related
My question is If I am hosting my website in HTTPS connection then could the cookie still be potentially stolen by an attacker to perform man in the middle attack?
In an HTTP connection, the attacker might intercept the cookie and can hijack a victim's session. So if the attacker can carry out a man in the middle attack, he can force the victim to make an http request and steal the cookie.
So does this risk is still there in the HTTPS connection? Or how can I make it more secure so that the attacker cannot steal the cookie?
The answer is YES.
Not sure if I am explaining this well enough.
But take a look at : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning
On an extra note:-
The cookie will reside on the user end and HTTPS just specifies that the connection that will be used between the two ends will be encrypted and an SSL certificate is used.
SSL certificates are what enable websites to move from HTTP to HTTPS, which is more secure. An SSL certificate is a data file hosted in a website's origin server. SSL certificates make SSL/TLS encryption possible, and they contain the website's public key and the website's identity, along with related information.
Or how can I make it more secure so that the attacker cannot steal the
cookie?
You must declare that on web.config using the requireSSL to force cookie only on secure connections
<httpCookies domain="domain.com" requireSSL="true"/>
more to read : Can some hacker steal a web browser cookie from a user and login with that name on a web site?
I would like to build a user management system.
I think it's not secure to send user's password from browsers to servers over HTTP.
But I'm not sure if it's secure to send message to servers over HTTPS.
Whether the password can be attack if using HTTPS
Thanks
I could find any quick answer on google. Most probably the answer lies somewhere in RFC docs on http or https however I just couldn't (too time consuming ) get those information.
So here is the question:
Is the content of a webpage served through HTTP signed digitally by the server ? Same question for HTTPS.
If yes, how does it work correctly when using a proxy ? In my opinion the proxy could tamper the data, sign the tampered data with it's own private key, and claim that the corresponding proxy's public key is actually the genuine public key of the original server ? I am assuming that the client can't check the original server's public key, because there is a proxy which could lie.
I am sorry if this is a dump question and easy searchable on the internet, but every answer I found posed some doubts to me.
Thanks for your help :)
Content sent via HTTPS is encrypted, clients verify the authenticity of the host certificates with whom they are communicating. The server uses a TLS/SSL key/certificate which is signed by certificate authorities (CA) The CAs make sure that they only sign the certificates of the rightful owners of a domain. The certificates of the CAs them-self are installed in you browser/OS. By using these pre-installed certificates, the browser can check if the key used by the remote server is signed by a trusted CA.
A man-in-the-middle does not have the original key, nor another key signed by a CA for the domain in question. Therefore, a man-in-the-middle cannot modify the content without breaking HTTPS.
On the other hand, if you want to use a proxy to cache requests, the proxy can terminate the HTTPS connections. This means the proxy has its own connection to the server and verifies the certificates. In order to secure the connection to the client, the proxy acts as a CA and uses a HTTPS connection with self-signed certificates. To avoid that your browser complains about an insecure connection, you need to install the proxies own CA certificate.
HTTP content is not signed and can be tampered with.
Edit 2018-06-15:
I wasn't really precise with the term "signed" here. The server does not actually sign the content it sends. This means if you store the responses from the server, you cannot prove that they came from that server, in other words: standard TLS dose not provide non-repudiation. However, the authenticity of the server is established during the handshake. The client encrypts a master-key with the servers public key. Only servers in possession of the private key can decrypt the master-key and derive session keys from them.
CAs, on the other hand, actually sign the certificates. A CA cannot validly deny that it signed for the authenticity of a server certificate.
Over ssl/tls can a query string be logged as the request hops around the net before it gets to its endpoint.
I know the endpoint can log the query string. I also know the endpoint server is trusted so I don't mind any logging there.
The way points of TCP traffic will see HTTPS data as cipher text that can't be decoded.
Logging at a TCP way point would require a MITM (man-in-the-middle) attack, which would require the user to be tricked into accepting a forged certificate (which is why browsers are becoming more strict about limiting click-through).
There are proxies that do SSL inspection (a.k.a SSL intercept), which are effectively doing just such a MITM--but such proxies generate the forged certificates with a CA certificate (Certificate Authority certificate) that is installed as a trusted CA certificate on the organization's clients (often by way of GPO policies).
So if you are in such an organization, you're requests are almost certainly logged (with more detail than just your query string [a.k.a path]), and you're content is being subjected to either malware protection (usually downstream) and/or DLP (Data Loss Prevention, usually to keep you're organization's sensitive information from being leaked).
There is something I don't understand, When I don't put certificate at all, the SSL connection is established successfully, I wonder how the server decrypt the message without client certificate.
What is client side certificate is for?
Thanks
As I understand it (the 15000 metre view.)
The server has a public key it publishes in its cert. This is used by your browser to encrypt everything it sends. Only the server can decrypt the info as only it (hopefully) has the private key.
If you have a client cert then you give this to the server to ensure that it encrypts stuff to you so only you can decrypt it (again with your private key).
So to me: You can send your credit card info completely freely, knowing that only the server can read it. The client can either then send a proper cert or create a 'temp' one for the session and then the 'public' encryption key to the server secure in the knowledge that no one else will have sent it. Then the comms are encrypted both ways, but separately.
Now from here
A TLS client and server negotiate a
stateful connection by using a
handshaking procedure. During this
handshake, the client and server agree
on various parameters used to
establish the connection's security.
The handshake begins when a client
connects to a TLS-enabled server
requesting a secure connection, and
presents a list of supported
CipherSuites (ciphers and hash
functions).
From this list, the server
picks the strongest cipher and hash
function that it also supports and
notifies the client of the decision.
The server sends back its
identification in the form of a
digital certificate. The certificate
usually contains the server name, the
trusted certificate authority (CA),
and the server's public encryption
key.
The client may contact the server
that issued the certificate (the
trusted CA as above) and confirm that
the certificate is authentic before
proceeding.
In order to generate the
session keys used for the secure
connection, the client encrypts a
random number (RN) with the server's
public key (PbK), and sends the result
to the server. Only the server should
be able to decrypt it (with its
private key (PvK)): this is the one
fact that makes the keys hidden from
third parties, since only the server
and the client have access to this
data. The client knows PbK and RN, and
the server knows PvK and (after
decryption of the client's message)
RN. A third party may only know RN if
PvK has been compromised. From the
random number, both parties generate
key material for encryption and
decryption.
This concludes the
handshake and begins the secured
connection, which is encrypted and
decrypted with the key material until
the connection closes.
This wikipedia article probably gives more info than you'll ever want.
Think about certificate not in terms of encrypting-decrypting, but in terms of authentication. Encryption can be done without certificates at all - just knowing open key is enough. But certificate contains different fields, among them is personality of certificate owner. For web this value is the domain name of the server you wish to connect to. As there are means to check that IP address of the server is always equal to name stated in certificate (forward and backward DNS requests), you can be sure that you're talking to the one you wish to.
In this terms, client certificate issue should be much simpler to understand. Client certificate allows server to authenticate client, so the authentication will be mutual. Server could check, for example, that the client certificate is valid (not expired, not black-listed, etc.).
Using a certificate from either the server or the client will give the endpoints a means of exchanging a shared secret (a symmetric encryption key - or seed).
A secondary purpose for the certificate (and one that's much less well-leveraged these days, relative to "encrypting the channel between endpoints") is to authenticate the endpoint supplying their digital certificate (using the cert and the proof of possession that they also send).
The overwhelming majority of SSL transactions these days are effectively only worried about the "encryption of the channel", not to authenticate the endpoint. (Practically speaking, it's a side benefit on the commercial internet, though the mass of man-in-the-middle attacks out there give us increasing incentive to try to figure out how to really know you're talking to the server - or client - that you think you are.)
In other words, the client certificate would be useful to authenticate (in a more or less "stronger" manner) that the server is interacting with either (a) a "more trusted" client (if all you were doing was ensuring that the cert is among a pool of certs you trust - e.g. mapped to an LDAP/AD directory of users you deem "trusted", or issued from a CA whose issuing practices you "trust") or (b) a specific user that you authenticate (e.g. again, through an LDAP/AD database of user, one - or more uncommonly, or more - of which has been mapped to that certificate through some automated or out-of-band - but either way, hopefully a sufficiently secure - process).