Situation
There is a site at examp.le that costs a lot of CPU/RAM to generate and a more lean examp.le/backend that will perform various tasks to read, write and serve user-specific data for authenticated requests. A lot of resources could be saved by utilizing a server side cache on the examp.le site but not on examp.le/backend and just asynchronously grab all user-specific data from the backend once the page arrives at the client. (Total loading time may even be lower, despite the need of an additional request.)
Threat model
CSRF attacks. Assuming (maybe foolishly) that examp.le is reliably safeguarded against XSS code injection, we still need to consider scripts on malicious site exploit.me that cause the victims browser to run a request against examp.le/backend with their authorization cookies included automagically and cause the server to perform some kind of data mutation on behalf of the user.
Solution / problem with that
As far as I understand, the commonly used countermeasure is to include another token in the generated exampl.le page. The server can verify this token is linked to the current user's session and will only accept requests that can provide it. But I assume caching won't work very well if we are baking a random token into every response to examp.le..?
So then...
I see two possible solutions: One would be some sort of "hybrid caching" where each response to examp.le is still programmatically generated but that program is just merging small dynamic parts to some cached output. Wouldn't work with caching systems that work on the higher layers of the server stack, let alone a CDN, but still might have its merits. I don't know if there is a standard ways or libraries to do this, or more specifically if there are solutions for wordpress (which happens to be the culprit in my case).
The other (preferred) solution would be to get an initial anti-CSRF token directly from examp.le/backend. But I'm not quite clear in my understanding about the implications of that. If the script on exploit.me could somehow obtain that token, the whole mechanism would make no sense to begin with. The way I understand it, if we leave exploitable browser bugs and security holes out of the picture and consider only requests coming from a non-obscure browser visiting exploit.me, then the HTTP_ORIGIN header can be absolutely trusted to be tamper proof. Is that correct? But then that begs the question: wouldn't we get mostly the same amount of security in this scenario by only checking authentication cookie and origin header, without throwing tokens back and forth?
I'm sorry if this question feels a bit all over the place, but I'm partly still in the process of getting the whole picture clear ;-)
First of all: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) are two different categories of attacks. I assume, you meant to tackle CSRF problem only.
Second of all: it's crucial to understand what CSRF is about. Consider following.
A POST request to exampl.le/backend changes some kind of crucial data
The request to exampl.le/backend is protected by authentication mechanisms, which generate valid session cookies.
I want to attack you. I do it by sending you a link to a page I have forged at cats.com\best_cats_evr.
If you are logged in to exampl.le in one browser tab and you open cats.com\best_cats_evr in another, the code will be executed.
The code on the site cats.com\best_cats_evr will send a POST request to exampl.le/backend. The cookies will be attached, as there is not reason why they should not. You will perform a change on exampl.le/backend without knowing it.
So, having said that, how can we prevent such attacks?
The CSRF case is very well known to the community and it makes little sense for me to write everything down myself. Please check the OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet, as it is one of the best pages you can find in this topic.
And yes, checking the origin would help in this scenario. But checking the origin will not help, if I find XSS vulnerability in exampl.le/somewhere_else and use it against you.
What would also help would be not using POST requests (as they can be manipulated without origin checks), but use e.g. PUT where CORS should help... But this quickly turns out to be too much of rocket science for the dev team to handle and sticking to good old anti-CSRF tokens (supported by default in every framework) should help.
A little background: We're currently trying try specify an HTTP API between a couple of vendors so that different products can easily inter operate. We're not writing any "server" software yet, nor any client, but just laying out the basics of the API so that every party can start prototyping and then we can refine it. So the typical use-case for this API would be being used by (thin) HTTP layers inside a given application, not from within the browser.
Communication doesn't really make sense without having session state here, so we were looking into how to track sessions typically.
Thing is, we want to keep the implementation of the API as easy as possible with as little burden as possible on any used HTTP library.
Someone proposed to manage session basically through "URL rewriting", but a little more explicit:
POST .../service/session { ... }
=> reply with 201 Created and session URL location .../service/session/{session-uuid}
subsequent requests use .../service/session/{session-uuid}/whatever
to end the session the client does DELETE .../service/session/{session-uuid}
Looking around the web, initial searches indicate this is somewhat untypical.
Is this a valid approach? Specific drawbacks or pros?
The pros we identified: (please debunk where appropriate)
Simple on the implementation, no cookie or header tracking etc. required
Orthogonal to client authentication mechanism - if authentication is appropriate, we could easily pass the URLs to a second app that could continue to use the session (valid use case in our case)
Should be safe, as we're going https exclusively for this.
Since, PHPSESSID was mentioned, I stumbled upon this other question, where it is mentioned that the "session in URL" approach may be more vulnerable to session fixation attacks.
However, see 2nd bullet above: We plan to implement~specify authentication/authorization orthogonally to this session concept, so passing around the "session" url might even be a feature, so we think we're quite fine with having the session appear in the URL.
I have a web site that reports about each non-expected server side error on my email.
Quite often (once each 1-2 weeks) somebody launches automated tools that bombard the web site with a ton of different URLs:
sometimes they (hackers?) think my site has inside phpmyadmin hosted and they try to access vulnerable (i believe) php-pages...
sometimes they are trying to access pages that are really absent but belongs to popular CMSs
last time they tried to inject wrong ViewState...
It is clearly not search engine spiders as 100% of requests that generated errors are requests to invalid pages.
Right now they didn't do too much harm, the only one is that I need to delete a ton of server error emails (200-300)... But at some point they could probably find something.
I'm really tired of that and looking for the solution that will block such 'spiders'.
Is there anything ready to use? Any tool, dlls, etc... Or I should implement something myself?
In the 2nd case: could you please recommend the approach to implement? Should I limit amount of requests from IP per second (let's say not more than 5 requests per second and not more then 20 per minute)?
P.S. Right now my web site is written using ASP.NET 4.0.
Such bots are not likely to find any vulnerabilities in your system, if you just keep the server and software updated. They are generally just looking for low hanging fruit, i.e. systems that are not updated to fix known vulnerabilities.
You could make a bot trap to minimise such traffic. As soon as someone tries to access one of those non-existant pages that you know of, you could stop all requests from that IP address with the same browser string, for a while.
There are a couple of things what you can consider...
You can use one of the available Web Application Firewalls. It usually has set of rules and analytic engine that determine suspicious activities and react accordingly. For example in you case it can automatically block attempts to scan you site as it recognize it as a attack pattern.
More simple (but not 100% solution) approach is check referer url (referer url description in wiki) and if request was originating not from one of you page you rejected it (you probably should create httpmodule for that purpose).
And of cause you want to be sure that you site address all known security issues from OWASP TOP 10 list (OWASP TOP 10). You can find very comprehensive description how to do it for asp.net here (owasp top 10 for .net book in pdf), i also recommend to read the blog of the author of the aforementioned book: http://www.troyhunt.com/
Theres nothing you can do (reliabily) to prevent vulernability scanning, the only thing to do really is to make sure you are on top of any vulnerabilities and prevent vulernability exploitation.
If youre site is only used by a select few and in constant locations you could maybe use an IP restriction
Thanks to everyone who commented or posted an answer! I've kept my original question and update below for completeness.
[Feb 16, 2011 - Update 2] As some people point out - my question should have been: Given a standard asp.net 4 form, if I don't have any server side validation, what types of malicious attacks am I susceptible to?
Here is my take away on this issue.
If data isn't sensitive (comments on a page) - from an asp.net security standpoint, following standard best practices (SqlParameters, request validation enabled, etc) will protect you from malicious attacks.
For sensitive data/applications - it's up to you to decide what type of server side validation is appropriate for your application. You need to think the end to end solution (webservices, other systems, etc). You can view a number of suggestions below - whitelist validation, etc.
If you are using ajax (xhr requests) to post user input you need to reproduce the protection from the other bullets in your code on the server. Again, lots of solutions below – like ensuring that the data does not contain any html/code, etc. (side note: the .net framework requestValidationMode="4.0" does afford some protection in this regard - but I can't speak to how complete a solution it is)
Please feel free to continue to comment...if any of the above is incorrect please let me know. Thanks!
[Feb 3, 2011 - Update 1] I want to thank everyone for their answers! Perhaps I should ask the reverse question:
Assume a simple asp.net 4.0 web form (formview + datasource with request validation enabled) that allows logged in users to post comments to a public page (comments stored in sql server db table). What type of data validation or cleansing should I perform on the new "comments" on the server side?
[Jan 19, 2011 - Original Question] Our asp.net 4 website has a few forms where users can submit data and we use jquery validate on the client side. Users have to be logged in with a valid account to access these forms.
I understand that our client side validation rules could easily be bypassed and clients could post data without required fields, etc. This doesn’t concern me very much - users have to be logged in and I don’t consider our data very “sensitive” nor would I say any of our validation is “critical”. The input data is written to the database using SqlParameters (to defend against sql injection) and we depend on asp.net request validation to defend against potentially dangerous html input.
Is it really worth our time to rewrite the various jquery validation rules on the server? Specifically how could a malicious user compromise our server or what specific attacks could we be open to?
I apologize as it appears that this question has been discussed a few times on this site – but I have yet to find an answer that cites specific risks or issues with not performing server side validation. Thanks in advance
Hypothetical situation:
Let's say you have a zip code field. On the client-side you validate that it must be in a "00000" or "00000-0000" pattern. Since you're allowing a hyphen, you decide to store the field as a varchar in the database.
So, some evil user comes along and decides to bypass all of your client-side validation and submit something that's not in the correct format and makes it past the request validation.
Ok, no big deal..., you're encoding it before displaying it back to the user later anyway.
But what else are you doing with that zip code? Are you submitting it to web service for some sort of lookup? Are you uploading it to a GPS device? Will it ever be interpreted by something else in the future? Does your zipcode field now contain some JSON or something else weird?
Or something like this: http://www.businessinsider.com/livingsocial-server-flaw-2011-1
Security is a dependability attribute that is defined as the probability that the system resists to an attack, or else the probability a fault is not maliciously activated.
In order to implement security, you must perform a threat analysis. Complex computer systems are subject to deeper analyses (think about an aircraft's o a control tower's equipment) as they become more critical and threats pose business or human life at risk.
You can perform your own threat analysis by questioning yourself what happens if a user bypasses validation?.
Two groups of answers, by examples:
Group 1 (critical)
The user can buy articles paying less than their price
The user can be revealed information about other users
The user obtains privileges he/she is not supposed to have
Group 2 (non critical)
The user is displayed inconsistent data in the next page
Processing continues, but the inconsistency leads to an error that requires human intervention
The user's data (but only of that user, not others) get compromised
A strange error page is returned to the user, with lots of technical information that cannot be used anyway
In the first case, you must definitely fix your validation problem, because you could lose money after an attack, or lose the trust of your public (think about forging Facebook URLs and showing someone's photos even if you are not mutually friends).
In the second case, if you are sure that an inconsistent field doesn't put your business or the data at risk, you may still avoid fixing
The real problem is
How do you prove that any inconsistent data sent to your website is never supposed to have any consequence over the system that may pose a threat?
So that's why you lose less time fixing your validation rather than thinking about it
Honestly, users don't care what you consider "sensitive" or "critical" data. Those criteria are up to them to decide.
I know that if I was a user of your application and I saw my data change without me directly doing something to cause the change...I would close my account up as fast as possible. It would be readily apparent that your system wasn't secure and none of my data was safe.
Keep in mind that you're forcing people to log in so you at least have their passwords somewhere. Whether or not they are easily accessed, a breach is a breach and I have lost my trust.
So...while you may not consider an input injection attack important, your users will and that is why you should still do server side input validation.
Your data may not be worth much, that's fine by me.
BUT, attackers could inject CSRF "cross site request forgery" attack code into your application; users of your site may have their data at other sites compromised. Yes, it would require those 'other sites' to have bugs, but that happens. Yes, it would require that users not use the 'logout' buttons on those sites, but not enough people use them. Think of all the tasty data your users have stored at other web sites. You wouldn't something bad to happen to your users.
Attackers could inject HTML that invites users to download and install 'plugins necessary for viewing this content' -- plugins that are keyloggers, or search hard drives for credit card numbers or tax filings. Maybe a plugin to become spambots or porn hosts. Your users trust your site to not recommend plugins that are owned by the Yakuza, right? They might not feel friendly if your site recommends installing evil things.
Depending upon what kinds of bugs invalid data might trigger, you might find yourself a spambot or a porn host. It heavily depends on how defensively you have coded other aspects of your application. Too many applications blindly trust input data.
And the best part: your users aren't human. Your users are browsers, which might be executing attacks supplied by other sites that didn't bother to perform good input validation and output sanitizing. Your users are viruses or worms that happen to find you by chance or by design. You might trust the individuals, but how far do you trust their computers? Me, not very far.
Please write applications to be as secure as you can -- you may put a large button on the front page to drop all users' data if you want -- but please don't intentionally write insecure programs.
This an excellent and brave question. The short (and possibly brave) answer is you don't. If you are aware of all the security vulnerabilities and you still don't believe it's necessary, then that's your choice.
It really depends on who your users are, who the site is exposed to (in terms of intranet or internet) and how easy it is to obtain an account. You say that your data is not sensitive yet you still require users to log in. How bad would it be if an unauthorised user were to access the system by hopping on another user's machine whilst they were elsewhere?
Bear in mind that relying on the request validation to look for malicious input can never be proved to be 100% safe so security is usually done at multiple levels with a fair bit of redundancy.
However it has to be your choice and you are doing the right thing to find out the consequences of leaving this out.
I believe that you need to validate both on the client side and on the server side, and here's why.
On the client side, you are often saving the user from submitting data that is obviously wrong. They have not filled in a required field. They have put letters in a field that is only supposed to contain numbers. They have provided a date in the future when only a date in the past will do (such as date of birth). And so on. By preventing these kinds of mistakes on the client side, you are avoiding user frustration, and also reducing the number of unnecessary hits to your web server.
On the server side, you should generally repeat all of the validation that you did on the client side. That is because, as you have observed, clever users can get around client-side validation and submit invalid data. In addition, there is some validation that is inefficient or impossible to do on the client side. Sometimes, you check that the data entry adheres to business rules. You might check it against existing data in the database. If you just let users enter anything (especially omitting required fields), the website won't function properly for them.
Check out the Tamper Data extension for firefox. You can feed the server anything you want very easily
Anyone performing HTTP POSTs to your server via your web site (with jQuery validation) can also perform HTTP POSTs via some other means that bypasses the jQuery validation. For example, I could use System.Net.HttpWebRequest to POST some data to your server with the appropriate cookies that injects malicious content into the form fields. I'd have to set up the __EVENT_VALIDATION and __VIEWSTATE fields correctly, but if I succeed, I'd be bypassing the validation.
If you don't have server-side data validation, then you are effectively not validating the inputs at all. The jQuery validation is nice for user experience but not a real line of defense.
This is especially so with inputs like a free-form comments field. You definitely want to ensure that the field does not contain HTML or other malicious script. As an extra measure of defense, you should also escape the comment content when it is displayed in your web app with a library like AntiXss (see http://wpl.codeplex.com/).
In terms of client-side vs. server-side validation, my opinion is that client-side validation is just to make sure the form is filled correctly and a user could tamper with the form and bypass the verifications you do in javascript.
On the server-side you could actually make sure that you actually want to store this data and validate it in depth manner and check relative database tables to ensure that your database is always normalized with any data set that you get from the client. I would say even that the server side is more important than the client side in terms of not showing the user what do you look for in the form and how you validate the data.
to summarize, I recommend verification on both sides, but if I had to choose between the two i would recommend server-side validation , but that could mean that your server could potentially performing additional validations that you could have prevented from validating on the client side
To answer your second question:
You need to use a whitelist to keep malicious input out of the incoming comments.
The .NET Framework request validation does a very good job of stopping XSS payloads in incoming POST requests. It may not, however, prevent other malicious or mischevious HTML from getting into the comments (image tags, hyperlinks, etc.).
So if possible I would set up whitelist validation on the server side for allowed characters. A regex should cover this just fine. You should allow A-Za-z0-9, whitespace, and a few punctuation marks. If the regex fails to match, return an error message to the user and stop the transaction. Regarding SQL Injection: I would allow apostrophes through in this case (unless you like terrible grammar in your comments), but put code comments around your parameterized SQL queries to the effect of: "This is the only protection against SQL, so be careful when modifying." You should also lock down the permissions of the database account used by the web process (read/write only, not database owner permissions). What I wouldn't do is try to do blacklist validation on the input, as that is very time consuming to do correctly (see RSnake's XSS Cheat Sheet at http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html for an idea of the number of things you would need to prevent just for XSS).
Between the .NET framework and your own whitelist validation you should be safe from HTML-based attacks such as XSS and CSRF*. SQL injection will be prevented by using parameterized queries. If the comment data touches any other assets you may need to put more controls in place, but those cover the attacks relevant to the basic data submission form you've outlined.
Also, I wouldn't try to "cleanse" the data at all. It is very difficult to do properly and users (as was mentioned above) hate it when their data is modified without their permission. It is more secure and more usable to give user's a clear error message when your data validation fails. If you put their comment back on the page for them to edit, HTML encode the output so you aren't vulnerable to a Reflected XSS attack.
And as always, OWASP.org (http://www.owasp.org) is a good reference for all things webappsec related. Check out their Top Ten and Development Guide projects.
*CSRF may not be a direct concern of yours, as fraudulent posts to your site may not matter to you, but preventing XSS has the side benefit of keeping CSRF payloads targeting other sites from being hosted from your site.
It seems that sticking to POST is the way to go because it results in clean looking URLs. GET seems to create long confusing URLs. POST is also better in terms of security. Good for protecting passwords in forms. In fact I hear that many developers only use POST for forms. I have also heard that many developers never really use GET at all.
So why and in what situation would one use GET if POST has these 2 advantages?
What benefit does GET have over POST?
you are correct, however it can be better to use gets for search pages and such. Places where you WANT the URL's to be obvious and discoverable. If you look at Google's (or any search page), it puts a www.google.com/?q=my+search at the end so people could link directly to the search.
You actually use GET much more than you think. Simply returning the web page is a GET request. There are also POST, PUT, DELETE, HEAD, OPTIONS and these are all used in RESTful programming interfaces.
GET vs. POST has no implications on security, they are both insecure unless you use HTTP/SSL.
Check the manual, I'm surprised that nobody has pointed out that GET and POST are semantically different and intended for quite different purposes.
While it may appear in a lot of cases that there is no functional difference between the 2 approaches, until you've tested every browser, proxy and server combination you won't be able to rely on that being a consistent in every case. e.g. mobile devices / proxies often cache aggressivley even where they are requested not to (but I've never come across one which incorrectly caches a POST response).
The protocol does not allow for anything other than simple, scalar datatypes as parameters in a GET - e.g. you can only send a file using POST or PUT.
There are also implementation constraints - last time I checked, the size of a URL was limited to around 2k in MSIE.
Finally, as you've noted, there's the issue of data visibility - you may not want to allow users to bookmark a URL containing their credit card number / password.
POST is the way to go because it results in clean looking URLs
That rather defeats the purpose of what a URL is all about. Read RFC 1630 - The Need For a Universal Syntax.
Sometimes you want your web application to be discoverable as in users can just about guess what a URL should be for a certain operation. It gives a nicer user experience and for this you would use GET and base your URLs on some sort of RESTful specification like http://microformats.org/wiki/rest/urls
If by 'web application' you mean 'website', as a developer you don't really have any choice. It's not you as a developer that makes the GET or POST requests, it's your user. They make the requests via their web browser.
When you request a web page by typing its URL into the address bar of the browser (or clicking a link, etc), the browser issues a GET request.
When you submit a web page using a button, you make a POST request.
In a GET request, additional data is sent in the query string. For example, the URL www.mysite.com?user=david&password=fish sends the two bits of data 'user' and 'password'.
In a POST request, the values in the form's controls (e.g. text boxes etc) are sent. This isn't visible in the address bar, but it's completely visible to anyone viewing your web traffic.
Both GET and POST are completely insecure unless SSL is used (e.g. web addresses beginning https).